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ABSTRACT
This thesis analyzed the impact of technological change on military manpower in the
future. The scope of the study was very broad in an attempt to capture the wide range
of social, economic, organizational and psychological affects that technological change
is expected to bring.
The review of the literature was divided into four sections: general, discipline-
specific, civilian sector forecasts, and military forecasts. The general section reviewed
popular Futurists and authors who have focused on the broad effects of technological
change. The discipline-specific section reviewed the theory of technological change
within four specific areas: economics, sociology, organizational theory, and psychology.
The civilian sector forecasts reviewed labor forecasts for the year 2000 and specific in-
dustry forecasts for various industries. The military literature review was structured un-
der policy, the future battlefield, manpower, technology, military medicine, and the
defense industry headings.
The literature i. s then synthesized to reveal several dominant trends in society,
work and the military that result from technological change. These trends include: shifts
in the occupational structure towards white-collar employment; an increase in the aver-
age educat onal quality of the future workforce; decentralized, smaller scale organiza-
tions, and movement towards an electronic battlefield.
Finally these trends were developed into a possible scenario for 2025. The scenario
was presented in three parts: the environment, civilian forecast, and military forecast.
Conclusions from the scenario that will impact defense policy included: force reductions,
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In a time of exploding change ... asking the very largest of questions about our fu-
ture is not merely a matter of intellectual curiosity. It is a matter of survival.
NWhether we know it or not, most of us are already engaged in either resisting - or
creating - the new civilization.... [Ref. 1: p. 22]
Predictions. projections, speculations or educated guesses about the days, months,
or years ahead are an essential part of the planning process. They provide a way
of preparing for the likely or less likely future. Typically, the attempt to see ahead
is based on experiences of the past, the only observation post available. In this way
we are often led to assume that force, of the past will continue in similar fashion
throughout the future. And here lies the great weakness of our ways: unexpected
occurrences in science, politics, economics, and social relations--maybe but a single
event--are capable of nullifying ary set of prophetic assumptions, and usually do.
[Ref. 21
Despite writing of "exploding change", even Toffler [Ref. 1] would have difficulty
imagining the changes that occurred in the world during 1989 and so far in 1990. The
collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the imminent end of the Cold War may initiate
sweeping changes to all of the communities within the United States (U.S.) military.
The U.S. has, since World War I1, been preparing to repel a Soviet invasion in Western
Europe. This strategy has dominated everything regarding the U.S. military establish-
ment. in particular the manpower and weapon system requirements. Now the U.S. finds
itself preparing for a war it may not even fight. The changes have been so significant,
that the world is a different place. As a result, the military will have to undergo swee'i:ng
changes in both structure and doctrine to prepare for the battles they are more likey to
fight in areas that will probably be far from the Fulda Gap.l [Ref. 31
The events of the past 12 months and their implications for the future may have
over-shadowed other factors that will also influence the strulcture of the U.S. military.
The 1990's and beyond will see a decrease in the availability ot manpower in the primary
recruiting pool for the U.S. armed forces. The military will be competing with educa-
tional institutions and private employers for a dwindling number of young high school
graduates. Recruiting trends will also fluctuate depending on the employment opportu-
I The Fulda Gap is located in the north of West Germany and adjacent to its border with East
Germany.
nities in the private sector and the recruiting environment is expected to be influenced
by numerous demographic, labor force, and technological trends in the 21st century.
The world is experiencing many, changes to its economic and political base. It has
been argued in some quarters that the introduction of numerous revolutionary new
technologies is causing widespread and rapid changes. The impact of the Age of High
Technology on the present and future is difficult to Fully comprehend. [Ref. 4] It is quite
possible that when the current wave of technologies are employed to their potential, or
a new wave of managers appear in th- market place, the impact of technology may be
enormous unless the appropriate social responses are adopted. The time has come to
examine the implications for the future. [Ref. 5]
In attempting to define technology, most people would think of the machines and
gadgets that surround our everyday lives and then state that technology is the machinery
that helps us in everything that we do in the world. Most people do not think of tech-
nology beyond this point. However technology has a much broader definition. One
dictionary defines technology as the "application of science." [Ref. 6] The World Book
Encvlopedia refers to technology as all "the ways man uses his [an old sexist edition]
inventions and discoveries to satisfy his needs and desires." [Ref. 7: p, 58f] These defi-
nitions put technology in the broader perspective. Ted nology is really the organization
of mankind's total knowledge for use in practical applications. It is not just the ma-
ch!:.er? buL the tozal knowledge. This can be seen by the extent and the v~riety of inltU-
ences technology has had on our institutions and values. Technology's effect on our
culture would be unintelligible if technology was simply defined as no more than ma-
chincry. [Ref. S: pp. 75-761
The requirement for studies regarding the future is critical. The future is almost
upon us and it is getting closer with each technological advaice. Since World War II
more technological change has occurred than in all of recorded history. When a com-
parison 'Ref. 9: pp.6-7] is made of the time from invention to application, the acceler-
ation of .cchnological change can be seen. It took 112 years for the camera to be widely
accepted, 56 years for the telephone, 35 years for radio, 15 years for radar, 12 years for
television, six years for the atomic bcmb and five years for the transistor to descend from
tLe laboratories to the radio. However change is not limited to technology. Many other
changes are occurring 1-i all parts of society--e.g., political and economic--that threaten
to change the world as we know it. Technology has allowed us to be aware of these
changes as they occur. Each new idea creates another and influences many more.
Change is feeding on itself at an ever increasing pace and changing the global structure.
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By studying the future directions of technology we will be able to anticipate the ef-
fects and prepare for the implications. It is important to note that technology does not
act alone. It is part of a dynamic group of forces that shape the direction of society.
There are seven broad factors that operate in a society: (1) Demographic; (2) Techno-
logical innovation; (3) Social innovation; (4) Cultural-value shifts; (5) Ecological shifts;
(6) Information-idea shifts; and (7) Cultural diffusion. [Ref. 9: pp. 9-101 While only
technological innovation will be discussed in this thesis, any in-depth study of the future
should examine each of these other factors and attempt to relate each to the other.
The influence of technology is now different from that in previous societies for three
reasons. Firstly, our tools are more powerful than in previous times. The coming of the
computer age has created a different world. Secondly, the power of modern technology
has brought about an awareness in each of us that technology is a determinant of our
lives and institutions. Finally, as a result of this increased awareness, there is a deliber-
ate attempt to understand and control technology for the benefit of society. We wish to
understand its far reaching implications, not just its economic effects. For these reasons
our time is unique from any earlier period and technology's role is thus deserving of our
attention. [Ref. 8: pp. 75-761
Technological change has both positive and negative effects on society. For each
opportunity created, a new problem is also generated. Technological change and social
change are closely rtlated. A techno'ogical development may create a new opportunity
to attain sonic goal and this leads to a change in the social structure to take advantage
of this new development. The functions of the social structure may be interfered with
and its previous goals may not be totally achieved as a result of this interference. [Ref
8: p. 76]
Technological change also challenges people's values. Because of new opportunities
offered by technology, people are faced with new choices that had previously not been
available to them. This strikes at the very heart of a society. "Man's technical prowess
always seems to run ahead of his ability to deal with and profit from it." [Ref. 8: p. 93]
Alvin Toffmer coined the term future shock to describe what occurs to individuals when
they are subjected to rapid change over a short time period. "Disorientation sets in when
our culture undergoes iapid change. Contemporary times, with all its shocks and sur-
prises, can induce a feeling of apprehensiveness. This can culminate in alienation from
the entire society to a point where we become apathetic, which is nurtured by a sense
of powerlessness or insignificance in the face of accelerated change." [Ref. 9: p. 5]
Therefore, it can be postulated that if individuals inform nselves about the future and
3
technology then they r3n, in effect, gain more time for themselves to be better prepared




The purpose of this thesis was to investigate the effects of technological change
on future military manpower policies up to the year 2025. The specific questions that
the study addressed were:
1. What areas of technology advancement will affect military manpower?
2. What are the implications of these advances in technology for military manpower?
Specifically, how will they affect skill level requirements, skill mix, total force size,
force structure, support structure, role management, and training?
3. How will advances in technology affect civilian employment? What will be the
occupational structure of civilian employment? What impact, if any, will this have
on the supply of labor to the military?
This thesis is part of the ongoing research on strategic analysis of military
manpower currently being conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School for the U.S.
Army Recruiting Command (USAREC). The umbrella project focuses on the attain-
ment and maintenance of a high quality force in the first quarter of the 21st century.
2. Scope
The scope of the study has been very broad regarding the subject matter re-
viewed. The study could have been limited to a narrow economic approach. For exam-
ple, an analysis of the effects of technological advances in both combat and support
systems in terms of capital and labor substitution to meet the military's requirements,
could have been undertaken. However, such a study would fail to address other critical
issues related to the effects of changing technology, such as the increased stress that may
be experienced by employees associated with high technology equipment [Ref. 10: p. 551
or the important role of management in the introduction of high technology. [Ref. 11:
p. 162] Therefore, a broader scope was applied in this study. In doing so, socio-technical
issues were addressed in order to place technological change into the appropriate social,
implementation, and managerial environment.
The study was carried out in three phases. First, the largest phase centered
around a structured review of available technological change literature. This review fo-
cused on recent literature, post 1983, since information prior to this date would be less
relevant for capturing current trends in technological change. In the second phase, the
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information gained from the literature review was related to military manpower issues.
The final phase synthesised these relationships into a scenario that accounted for the
possible future effects of technological change on military manpower.
3. Organization
In Chapter I1 the literature obtained is reviewed. The literature reviewed ranges
from topical magazine articles to research reports and monographs. Such a range was
chosen in an attempt to capture the theories and discussions that have been developed
and tested over recent years and also new ideas that have only recently appeared.
Chapter 1I discusses those technologies which are likely to have military applications
and the possible future economic, employment, sociological, and psychological effects
of technological change on both society as a whole and the military.
Chapter III summarizes and then synthesizes the literature from Chapter II and
then discusses the implications for the future, as they relate to my research questions.
Chapter IV discusses one future scenario for the year 2025 and its implications for
manpower policy in the 1990"s. The scenario is based on the literature summarized in
Chapter III and is divided into three parts; environment, civilian, and the military.
11. LITERATURE REVIEW
There is an abundance of literature discussing technological changes and their future
impact. The literature reviewed in this chapter is a representative sample of that which
is available and has been discussed under several broad subject headings. The chapter
begins with a discussion of the general theories regarding technological change. The next
section discusses the discipline-specific theories of technological change: economic, psy-
chological, sociological, and organizational. The third section reviews the civilian sector
forecasts for technological change providing several author's views across specific in-
dustry areas. The final section reviews the military forecasts offering several opinions
on technological change in the military and its impacts in the future.
A. GENERAL THEORIES
The general topics, technological change and the future, have been discussed by se-
veral authors. They either discuss the future, highlighting what society may look like a
certain period into the future, or they discuss their expectations for technological
change. Those who focus on the future describe the factors which will most dominate
society in the future. These factors cover a broad spectrum, ranging from the political
and sociological to the technological. These authors have attracted the name Futurists.
Those authors who have focused on technological change have looked at the effects on
employment in general rather than on any one area of employment or industry. I have
labelled these authors Issue Writers.
1. Futurist Studies
Alvin Tomer, author of The Third Wave, [Ref. 1], published in 1981, was one
of the first modern futurists to be taken seriously. His work has be widely quoted by
other authors as one possible outcome for future societies. He has since refined his im-
pressions of the Third Wave society in a paper of the same title, [Ref. 8: pp. 59-71]
published in 1986. It is the 1986 paper [Ref. 8: pp. 59-711 that is reviewed here.
Toffler's vision for the Third Wave society is not simply an extensior of current
society but one of radical change. lie believes that the present social and economic
problems are signs of the Second Wave society collapsing, but at the same time laying
the foundations for the Third Wave society. The path to the Third Wave society will
not be gentle, but characterised by great social turbulence.
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Toffler has offered some insight as to what this Third Wave society will look
like. The Third Wave society will access many energy sources, both known and un-
known and will not rely heavily on any single source. The technology base will be wide
and varied. Most new technologies will use less energy and will not be as ecologically
dangerous as those of the past.
Toffmer believes that information will be the basic raw material of the new soci-
ety. Information will cause the society to restructure its education system, redefine sci-
entific research, and reorganize the media of communication. The Third Wave society
will not be dominated by the mass-media of today as it will be inadequate to cope with
the cultural variety needed by the Third Wave society. Instead, inter-active, demassified
media will transmit highly personalized imagery in and out of the mind-stream of society.
Television will give way to individeo, a narrow casting projected to one individual at a
time. ie believes that we may use drugs to initiate brain-to-brain communication and
other forms of electrochemical communication.
The fusion of new energy forms, technologies and information media will radi-
cally change work as we know it. Only a few people will be employed in factories that
will be able to customize their products to the customers wish and in some cases the
customer will activate the production process. Work will be less physical with workers
being able to choose the hours they work. Compensation packages will be individually
tailored for each employee. Factories are likely to be decentralized, smaller in size, and
located away from the major urban centers. The office of the future will be paperless.
The employees who will be needed in these factories and offices will need to be capable
of discretion and resourcefulness.
However, Toffler believes the most radical change will be the shift of work from
both the office and factory back to the home. Not all work will be carried out in the
home but cheaper communications will make it possible for some facets of work to be
performed from the home. For this reason, Toffler sees the home assuming a new im-
portance in the Third Wave society. However, it will not dominate the Third Wave so-
ciety as other institutions have in previous societies; rather, Third Wave societies will
be built around a network rather than a hierarchy of new institutions.
Finally, Toffler's Third Wave society will disperse and de-concentrate. It will not
opt for maximurr ,ale instead; it will adopt the appropriate scale. It will not centralize;
instead, it will decentralize decision-making. This will cause a shift away from the old-
fashioned bureaucracies and those that remain will be flatter and more transient,
7
Another well known and respected author whose futurist work has been widely
discussed is John Naisbitt. His first book, Megatrends, [Ref. 12] drew much attention.
He, along with co-author Patricia Aburdene, has recently updated his views in Mega-
trends 2000. [Ref. 13] It is this new monograph that is primarily reviewed here.
In his first book (Ref. 12] Naisbitt saw the following 10 trends occurring in the
world:
1. A shift from an industrial society to an information society;
2. A shift from forced technology to high tech/high touch. That is, whenever a new
technology is introduced into society, there must be a counterbalancing human
response--high touch--or the technology is rejected. Therefore the more high tech,
the more high touch;
3. A shift from a national economy to a world economy;
4. A shift in emphasis in business from short-term to long-term planning;
5. A shift from centralization to decentralization;
6. A shift from institutional help to self-help;
7. A shift from representative democracy to participatory democracy;
8. A shift from hierarchies to networking;
9. A shift in the population base in zhe U.S. from the north to the south;
10. A shift from the either'or to the multiple option. People are faced with more
choices than they were in the past.
Naisbitt and Aburdene in the introduction to Megatrends 2000 [Ref. 13] said
that these trends are on course but that at the beginning of the 1990's they were now
only a part of the picture. The 10 current trends that were considered the most impor-
tant were:
1. The booming global economy of the 1990's;
2. A renaissance in the arts;
3. The emergence of free-market socialism;
4. Global lifestyles and cultural nationalism;
5. The privatization of the welfare state;
6. The rise of the Pacific Rim;
7. The decade of women in leadership;
8. The age of biology;
9. The religious revival of the new millennium;
10. The triumph of the individual.
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Not all of these tiends find a place for technology and therefore only those most strongly
related to technological change will be discussed here.
The movement to the global economy is being driven by an alliance between
economics and telecommunications, allowing vast and instantaneous information to be
transmitted on a global scale. Well-educated, skilled information workers will earn the
highest wages as the information economy evolves. However, because these types of
jobs require highly educated workers they cannot be filled from the human resource base
in the U.S. at this time.
Naisbitt also asserts that the disappearing middle-class is a myth. If anything
it is disappearing up. The unskilled, uneducated worker is the one who is threatened the
most by the information society. Those with a college education will be the best pre-
pared for the information society.
Trade, television, and travel have laid the groundwork for a global lifestyle.
People throughout the world are experiencing new fashions, foods, gimmicks, enter-
tainment, film, and music. People are aware of the injustices in other countries and
through political actions and the human rights movement are trying to create a global
lifestyle.
In the new information society, the information worker is typically a woman.
During the 1970's and 1980's two thirds of the jobs created in the information arena
were filled by women. These women are now moving into the middle ranks. With the
major themes in business for the 1990's seen as technological change, shortened product
cycles, and global competition, it is imperative that corporate leaders and middle man-
agers possess the leadership to survive and prosper in this environment of accelerating
change. Firms will be turning to more and more women for this leadership.
The age of biology will probably provide the greatest challenge to society. This
science has the capability to end the world food shortage and to extend and create life.
The moral decisions that society must make will cut across institutional boundaries and
basic individual values. The potential is also there for disaster.
Finally, Naisbitt and Aburdene, see that technology has changed the importance
of sca!e and location within business and has thus extended power to the individual.
They say that labor unions are out of sync with the workers who want to be treated as
individuals while the unions are trying to have them treated as an homogenous quantity.
This trend will create reward systems tailored for the individual. The communications
and information technologies will create an electronic heartland in the U.S. as workers
escape from the larger urban centers seeking a quality lifestyle. It has been estimated
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that between one third and one half of U.S. and Canada's middle class will live outside
of the major urban centers by the year 2010.
The pictures painted by both Tofler and Naisbitt are very positive. Other au-
thors do not share the same optimistic view about the future. Rochell and Spellman in
their book Dreams Betrayed. Working in the Technological Age [Ref. 14] suggest that the
information age may create serious problems for society. They see new technology cre-
ating massive underemployment where people will be unable to realize their full potential
as automation takes over. The biggest impact of the information age will be the decline
of the middle class. The requirements for managers will decline. The bell-like curve,
based on an individuals income, that has represented society will be replaced with the
coke bottle curve (i.e., less dispersion). Society will be divided into upper and lower
classes. The impact this polarization will have on society may be enormous and could
lead to the degradation of society as we know it.
The central actor in the future, as Rochell and Spellman see it, will be the
computer. It is changing the workplace. Labor is now organized to work with the
computer as opposed to directing it. This is causing workers to lose control and an
understanding of their work. The end result is displaced labor. The migrant and mi-
nority workforce is also threatened as automation replaces more and more routine work.
Rochell and Spellman believe that most businesses have a straight forward mo.-
tive for automating--the rationalization (based on cost) of pioduction and the reduction
of the workforce to meet production goals. This allows for centralization of control,
which compliments the polarization of the workforce.
Rochell and Spellman attack the positive outlook for the future of both Toffier
and Naisbitt. They preach what is technologically possible but Rochell and Spellman
question whether it is politically, economically, and institutionally possible. In addition,
Toffmer and Naisbitt may fail to consider the many uncertainties and unknowns--
especially how unprepared the workforce is for the future.
In her book, Creating Alternative Futures, Henderson [Ref. 15] sees society in a
state of future shock.
As technological mastery increased, the increasing scale of innovations, together
with the cumulative effects of many small applications, began making even more
pervasive impacts on populations, social structures and ecosystems. Today the un-
anticipated effects of our growing knowledge and the technologies it creates have
seemingly outrun adaptive capabilities, whether psychological, social, organizational
or political. The result is the current series of unruly crises. Whether we designate
them as 'energy crises,' 'environmental crises,' ... we should recognize the extent to
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which they all are rooted in the larger crisis of our inadequate, narrow perceptions
of reality.
... now that many of the world's nations are technologically advanced,
global impacts and interdependencies are the rule rather than the exception; there-
fore, narrow perceptions become increasingly dangerous and lead to decisions based
on inadequate information concerning larger and longer-range patterns of causality.
[Ref. 15: pp. 303-305]
Henderson concluded that the dreams of "technology-based hedonism" are pre-
mature and based on inadequate models. She believes that this dream cannot be at-
tained until, among other things, the impacts of technology are reduced. "It is time for
the science and technology of industrialism to realize its conceptual limitations. The
stakes have never been higher for human survival." [Ref. 15: p. 324]
Florman [Ref. 8: pp. 122-132] also notes the negative impacts of technology.
He does not condemn technological change. He sees it as inevitable and ultimately
leading to a better society. However, he warns against overly optimistic forecasts and
emphasises a more realistic approach in considering the consequences of technological
innovations.
Perhaps most important is the observation of Schnaais [Ref. 16] who, after an-
alyzing technological forecasts for the 1980's that were made in the 1960's and 1970's,
concluded that only 20 to 25 percent came true. le suggests there is little evidence tha.t
forecasters, professionals and amateurs alike, have an accurate picture of what our
technological future will look like.
2. Issue Writers
This second part of the general theories section reviews those authors who dis-
cussed the general issues as they relate to technological change. Firstly, Leontief and
Duchin [Ref. 171 present a preliminary report on a study designed to improve the
understanding of the impacts of past technological change on employment in the U.S.
and assess probable future effects of computer-based automation on the demand for la-
bor. The period that the study covered was 1963 to 2000. The analytical model used for
the U.S. economy was a dynamic input-output model. The model used data that de-
scribed past technologies and technological change that was to be introduced in the near
future. Thev studied the entire economy, dividing it into almost 100 industries.
The model is used to project year-by-year for the study period, the sectoral
outputs and investments, and labor requirements for the U.S economy under a set of
alternate assumptions. Each set of assumptions made up a scenario. Four scenarios
(F'l, S2, S3, S4) were discussed by Leontief and Duchin.
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Scenario S I was the base case and assumed no further automation or techno-
logical change after 1980. Scenario S2 and S3 are identical to SI before 1980 but differ
in their technological assumptions for the later years. They project an increasing use
of computers in all sectors. S3 assumes more rapid technological change and quicker
adoption of the new technology than S2, particularly with the adoption of robots in
manufacturing. Scenario S4 is identical to S3 in its assumptions about technological
structure however S4 uses different demand projections.
The results of this study suggest that the extensive use of automation up to 2000
will produce significant labor savings over those technologies and methods currently in
use. Leontief has projected that over 20 million fewer workers are required in 2000 un-
der scenario S3 compared to SI. This represents a saving of 11.7 percent of S1 require-
ments (the reference scenario).
Some of the results of the study, i.e., the levels and composition of the labor
force for each of the scenarios, are shown in Table 1 and Table 2. The levels of em-
ployment in 1978 are the same for all three scenarios. Bureau of Labor Statistics esti-
mates for 1978, not shown in the table, were all within one percentage point of Leontief
and Duchin's model. The figures presented in the tables include all private sector em-
ployment plus employment in public education and health. They do not include public
administration, armed forces, or household employees.
The effects of automation projected for 2000 are different for each of the three
scenarios. There is an increase in the numbers and proportion of professionals and a
reduction in the numbers of clerical workers as one moves through the three scenarios.
Professionals are predicted to account for nearly 20 percent of the labor requirements in
Scenario 3, up from 15.6 percent in 1978. Leontief and Duchin noted that this will
mainly be for computer specialists and engineers. The demand for clerical workers falls
from 17.7 percent in 1978 to 11.4 percent in 2000. The other interesting result is the
reduction of managers from 10.8 percent of the labor force in 1978 to 7.2 percent in 2000
under Scenario 3.
Leontief and Duchin noted the impact of robots on semi-skilled occupations
and laborers is only modest. They also noted that the net demand for these labor cate-
gories was about the same for both Scenario's S1 and S3 in 2000. They suggested this
was due to the offsetting effects of the increased productivity.
The study also made forecasts for output growth and capital flows. These re-
sults are not presented in this review.
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Table 1. LEVELS OF EMPLOYMENT: Under Scenarios SI, S2, and S3, for
1978 and 2000. Figures are in millions of person-years.
OCCUPATION S1,$2,$3 S1 S2 S3
1978 2000 2000 2000
Professionals 13.9 25.6 28.4 31.1
Managers 9.5 19.0 17.1 11.2
Sales Workers 5.9 12.4 11.8 10.2
Clerical Workers 15.9 32.6 25.0 17.9
Craftsmen 11.8 23.3 22.9 23.4
Operatives 14.0 27.6 26.1 25.8
Service Workers 11.1 22.3 22.4 23.0
Laborers 4.3 8.7 8.6 8.7
Farmers 2.8 5.3 5.3 5.4
Total 89.2 176.8 167.7 156.6
Source:Leontief, W., and Duchin, F., The Future Impact of Automation on Workers, p.
13, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986.
Hirschhorn [Ref. 181 presents the argument that postindustrial factory technol-
ogy requires work settings organized with the total social and technical system consid-
ered. Ile believes that the notion that the computer will eliminate human skills is wrong.
On the contrary, new processes create new problems and errors with which skilled
workers must become familiar and overcome. He contends that we still know only a little
about job designs and the skills required for work settings employing new technologies.
Hirschhorn believes today's workers must understand the entire production
process so they are able to respond to the unpredictable. He sees that machine systems
can no longer be regarded as fixed and perfect but rather shaped by contingencies. He
contrasts the industrial age worker with the post-industrial age worker. In the industrial
age, the semi-skilled worker performed rote tasks and the skilled worker varying tasks
within a fixed reference frame. In the post-,ndustrial age, workers perform develop-
mental tasks, operating at the boundary between the old technical realities and emerging
ones.
Hirschhorn concluded from several of his studies that firms that had undertaken
increased capital expenditure for new technology depended more on their workers than
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Table 2. COMPOSITION OF EMPLOYMENT: Under Scenarios SI, S2, and
S3, for 1978 and 2000. Figures are percentages.
OCCUPATION SI,$2,S3 S1 S2 S3
1978 2000 2000 2000
Professionals 15.6 14.5 16.9 19.8
Managers 9.5 10.8 10.2 7.2
Sales Workers 6.6 7.0 7.0 6.5
Clerical Workers 17.8 18.4 14.9 1 i.4
Craftsmen 13.3 13.2 13.7 15.0
Operatives 15.7 15.6 15.6 16.5
Service Workers 12.4 12.6 13.4 14.7
Laborers 4.9 4.9 5.1 5.5
Farmers 3.2 3.0 3.2 3.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source:Leonticf, W., and Duchin, F., The Future Impact of Automation on Workers, p.
14, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986.
before. f Hirschhorn saw this as crucial Yi the organizational and job design process. -te
contended that technology alone cannot determine work and organizational design but
it can set limits within which design decisions can be made.
Shaiken [Ref. 19] continues the argument that automation in the workplace is
being used by management to increase their control over the worker. He contends that
all levels of the workforce structure are being kept under the eye of Big Brother Tech-
nology in forms that include management information systems (MIS), flexible manufac-
turing systems (FMS), computerized numerical control (CNC), and many other new
technology based methods.
Shaiken believes that the control that management has over the worker is con-
tradicting the workers' desire for more autonomy and may jeopardize possible produc-
tivity and efficiency gains. He notes that the information that automation can give
management allows management to control the pace, flow, quality, quantity of pro-
duction and thus make all of the decisions. Shaiken predicted this will slowly erode
worker power and control over the production process leading to the globalization of
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operations via the computer. Therefore, managerial control is guiding the restructuring
of production.
Shaiken believes that this dominance by technology and management should
be reversed. The worker must be made more involved with the whole decision process
regarding new technologies. He believes that technology can be introduced so that jobs
become more interesting and some decisions may be made at the shop floor. He sug-
gested a Technology Bill of Rights demanding three things: (1) New technology must be
used in a way that creates or maintains jobs; (2) New technology must be used to im-
prove the condition of work; and (3) New technology must be used to develop the in-
dustrial base and improve the environment.
Shaiken's opinions are interesting when compared to the results of an investi-
gation into the impact of microcomputers on American industry by Risman and
Tomaskovic-Devey [Ref. 201 They attempted to clarify the opposing hypotheses that: (1)
Technology is primarily an independent or causal variable in organizational change; or
(2) Both the pace and specific organization of technologica! advancement is governed
by the pre-existing social organization in the firm.
The latter hypothesis suggests that technological innovation will only be ex-
ploited for the satisfaction of the internal forces that govern an organization. They
concluded from the results of the study that little reorganization of industry had oc-
curred to take advantage of *he flexibility that microcomp iters offer. Instead, manage-
ment had blocked many changes due to a concern over increased employee control. This
would appear to support the later hypothesis.
In 19S5 The Panel on TechnoloK and Employ.'nent was organized by a joint
committee of the National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, and
the Institute of Medicine. The panel was charged to assess the employment effects re-
lated to technological change. Since this time the panel has published two books and a
conference proceedings. [Ref. 11] [Ref 21] [Ref. 22] It is from these references that the
final part of this General section is drawn.
Podgursky [Ref. 11: pp. 3-41] noted that the labor market of recent years has
experienced much turbulence with job displacements caused by plant closures, and
business relocations being fairly widespread. Hie could not identify a specific reason for
the displacements but noted that many were in goods-producing industries where,
among other things, labor-saving technologies are employed.
Podgursky noted that median duration of joblessness for the displaced worker
was considerably longer for the blue-collar worker than the white-collar or service
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worker. It was also shorter for men than women. He also noted that median losses ir,
reemployment earnings were less than 15 percent but with a wide dispersion. He con-
cluded that job displacement was a widespread problem and that a sizable proportion
of these workers--perhaps 25 percent--suffer very large economic losses as a result of
displacement.
Spenner [Ref. 11: pp. 131-1841 discussed the results of his review of several case
studies in an attempt to assess the effects of technological change on skill requiremen;ts
and education. fie described the results as provisional as there were many conflicting
trends. Firstly, he saw that the skill requirements of the U.S. economy as changing. The
rate of change has been slow but for selected occupations it has been more substantial.
This chance in skills is -haracterized by an increase in skills regarding job complexity
but a decrease in skills regarding job autonomy and control. Secondly and more im-
portantly, he noted the roles that managers, market forces, and organizational cultures
had in controlling the effects of technology on the number and quality of jobs. He re-
ferred to empirical evidence that showed opposite effects of similar technology on jobs.
Finally, Spenner, in attempting to link technological change and education, argued that
within limits research on technological change and skill requirements informs the edu-
cation and training policy. Education and training in turn can be expected to inform
and solve human problems associated with technological change.
The principal finding from The Panel on Technology and Employmet [Ref. 21:
p. 3] was that technological change was an essential component of an expanding econ-
omy. They saw that recent and proposed levels of technological change would not result
in significant increases in unemployment, though individuals will experience difficult and
costly adjustments. They concluded that the U.S. economy must generate and adopt
new technologies rapidly in all sectors of the economy if growth in employment and
vkages is to be maintained. If appropriate public and private policies are adopted to
support the adjustment to ne" technologies then technological change will not produce
mass unemployment. Instead, it will contribute to higher livin- standards, wages, and
employment levels.
The panel went on to summarize their central findings. [Ref. 21: p. 5-7] Firstly,
regarding the employment and wage impacts of technological change on an open econ-
omy:
1. Technological change and productivity growth has historically been associated with
exp-nding rather than contracting total employment and rising earnings. This
pattern will experience little change in the future.
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2. The adoption of new technologies generally is gradual rather than sudden. The
gradual pace of technological change should simplify the development and imple-
mentation policies to help affected workers.
3. Slow adoption by U.S. firms, relative to other industrial nations, of productivity-
increasing technologies is likely to cause more job displacement than the rapid
adoption of such technologies.
4. The rate of technology transfer across national boundaries has grown; for the U.S.,
this transfer increasingly incorporates significant inflows of technology from for-
eign sources, as well as outflows of U.S. research findings and innovations.
Secondly, the results regarding technology and the characteristics of future jobs
included:
1. New technologies by themselves are not likely to change the level of job-related
skills required for the labor force as a whole. The level of skills are not going to
rise o fall in the U.S. economy as a result of technological change.
2. Technological change will not limit employment opportunities for individuals en-
tering the labor market with strong basic skills.2 The panel noted that the most
reliable projections predicted that the number of jobs in the broad occupational
groups that accounted for the majority of job entrants will continue to expand.
Finally, the panel's conclusions regarding technology and work force adjustment
noted that a substantial proportion--20 to 30 percent--of displaced workers lack basic
skills. These are the workers who have the longest delays in finding new employment
and incur the most significant reductions in wages. The panel suggests that displaced
workers who receive substantial advance notice of permanent job loss experience shorter
periods of unemployment than workers who do not receive notice.
To address these findings the panel made several recommendations that centered
around adjustment assistance for the displaced worker and included: broadening the
range of employment services; increasing the funds available for basic skills training;
enforcing employers to give advance notice of job losses; and broadening income sup-
port for the displaced worker. The panel recommended that management should give
advance notice of possible displacements and consult with workers about job design and
technological change. Also, the adoption of new workplace technologies should be ac-
companied by employment policies that strengthen employment security. These policies
include retraining programs and reliance on attrition rather than retrenchment.




This section discusses the approaches and theories of various academic disciplines
as they apply to technological change. The disciplines discussed in this section are:
economic, psychological, sociological and organizational theories of technological
change.
1. Economic Theory of Technological Change
The economic theory discussed will be restricted to the microeconomic theory
of technological change and is drawn from several references. [Ref 231 [Ref. 24J [Ref.
25]
a. Neo-Classical Theory
The most well known theory that addresses technological change is the
neo-classical theory of production. [Ref. 23] Th~s theory describes the relationships be-
tween quantities of inputs and outputs in the productive unit, and in so doing makes
several simplifying assumptions regarding the firm and the market. The technology that
exists at any point in time sets limits for the firm regarding: which products are
produced; how much of these products can be produced with a set of inputs; and how
these products are produced. It is assumed that production will require input in the form
of both capital and labor,3 the combination of which will produce various levels of out-
put. The production function embodies the technological relationship of inputs to out-
puts such that for any combination of inputs the production function associates the
maximum possible output for a given technology with that input combination.
Therefore, if technological change occurs (e.g., a new production process is
made available) the production function is altered so that for a given quantity and
combination of inputs, total output will be greater after the change than it was before.
This relationship can be seen graphically in Figure 1. Here the production function is
plotted as the isoquant at position one represents the maximum output of a product
given various combinations of the two inputs, capital and labor. Given an advance in
technology, the production function moves towards the origin to position two. Thus at
position two, the various combinations of the inputs will be less but, as a result of the
technological change, still produce the same level of output.
However, the movement that the production function takes towards the
origin can follow a number of paths. The path that the production function takes clas-
3 Capital is traditionally known as the mechanical input of the machines used in the pro-






Source: Mansfield, E., Microeconomics: Theory and
Applications, New York: W.W. Norton and Company, p. 443,
1970.
Figure 1. Change over a Period of Time in the Position of an Isoquant
sifies technological change in one of three ways as either, labor-saving, capital-saving, or
neutral. In Figure 2, Q2, Q3, and Q4 all correspond to more advanced technologies
than Q1. However, the change from Q1 to the each of the three examples is
quantitatively different and highlights the three classifications of technological change.
The movement from QI to Q2 results in the same combination of inputs--neutral tech-
nological change. The movement from Q1 to Q3 results in proportionally more capital
than labor--labor-saving technological change. The movement from QI to Q4 results in
proportionally more labor than capital--capital-saving technological change.
There are several limitations to this theory. The most significant regarding







Source: Coombs, R., Saviotti, P., and Walsh, V.,
Economics and Technological Change, Totowa, NJ:
Rowman and Littlefield, p. 27, 1987.
Figure 2. Classifications of Technological Change
b. Measurement of the Rate of Technological Change
Productivity has long been studied by economists, particularly labor pro-
ductivity; output per man-hour of labor. One of the determinants of growth in labor
productivity is the rate of technological change. [Ref. 25: p. 4481 However, increases in
the rate of technological change, though frequently measured from increases in labor
productivity, is not the only determinant of labor productivity. Changes in the relative
amount of capital used within the context of the same technology can increase the pro-
ductivity of labor. Thus, growth in labor productivity, as a measure of technological
change, can lead to incorrect conclusions regarding the rate of technological change.
Other measures [Ref. 25: pp. 449-450] for the rate of technological change
include: (1) productivity indices that account for changes in all factors of production;
and (2) a measure that, after isolation of other determinants of productivity growth,
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leaves a residual of the productivity growth that is said to measure the rate of techno-
logical change. Each of these measures also have their limitations.
The resources devoted to research and development (R&D) by firms, private
research organizations, inventors, and governments are viewed as the determinants of
the rate of technological change. [Ref. 25: pp. 450-451] Where and how many resources
are devoted to R&D is influenced by the profitability of the investment in a large number
of cases, however other factors do influence R&D that are not profit initiated. Examples
of these include investments in military R&D that are made to maintain or gain military
superiority.
Most of the impacts of technological change can be categorized into supply
and demand factors. On the supply side, a particular product may become more scarce
(expensive) and this in turn will initiate research for alternate products. For example,
when the OPEC countries increased the price of oil in the late 1970's, it initiated or
stepped-up research into alternative energy sources and increased the search for other
oil producing areas in the world. On the demand side, a particular technological advance
may reduce the cost of a product, and thus it's price, which in turn increases it's supply.
This increase in supply will, through the effects of consumer income, tastes, and the
prices of competing goods, increase the demand for the product.
Another factor that is said to affect the rate of technological change is
market s ructure. (Ref. 25: pp. 462-465] The discussion centers on the argument that the
inefficiencies of an non-competitive market can be offset by its having a higher rate of
technological change and greater productivity increases. Theorists who support this ar-
gument state that firms in a competitive economy have low profit margins and thus have
low reserves of money to devote to R&D. In addition, firms who don't have control
over the market may see the introduction of an innovation as not worthwhile. Com-
petitors may be able to imitate the innovation quickly and thus little may be gained from
the innovation by the innovator.
An opposing viewpoint holds that non-competitive markets do not place
enough pressure on firms to introduce new techniques or technologies as there are high
profits without undertaking R&D. The U.S. automobile industry may be a good exam-
ple of this hypothesis. In addition there are more market entry barriers for new firms in
the non-competitive economy, making it difficult to initiate new ideas into the market.
c. Technology and Structural Change in the Long Run
Bessant and Senker in their paper, Societal Implications of Advanced Manu-
facturing Technology, [Ref. 10: pp. 153-171] noted that previous research by Freeman,
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Clark and Soete (1982) suggests that evidence exists to suppor t the existence of
Kondraiev long waves,4 an economic cycle with a of 40-50 year periodicity associated
with major technological changes. Freeman, et al., have identified four characteristics
of such major technologies: [Ref 10: p. 153]
1. They introduce major cost reductions for more than a few products or sectors.
Examples are the railways and electricity.
2. They contribute major technical advantages; for example, reliability, quality, and
accuracy, across a wide range of industrial sectors and applications.
3. They have pervasive effects throughout the economic system.
4. They are socially and environmentally acceptable.
The effects that these major technologies have on the market structure and
demand follow a cycle--a long wave. Initially, there is strong consumer resistance and
ignorance with only a few small firms existing to promote the basic innovations. This
is followed by a period of intense competition for a better design and performance.
More firms enter the market and prices begin to decline. The next phase sees the
growing concentration and intense technological competition and some price competi-
tion. This leads to strong support for exporting and exploiting scale economies. The
final phase of the cycle sees the market structure dominated by monopolies or
oligopolies, with mergers and bankruptcies cormnon place.
The effects on labor follow a similar pattern. Initially there are small-scale
employment effects with a high percentage of skilled labor, engineers, and technicians.
This is followed with large increases in employment opportunities as production ex-
pands. New skills are in short supply which leads to rapid increases in pay. Then as the
market growth slows this leads to a slowing of the employment growth with the capital
investments intensifying. This leads to more routine jobs. Finally, employment growth
comes to a halt, unemployment begins to rise, and labor displacement occurs as firms
begin to rationalize. A period of general recessional and depressional tendencies in the
economy begins. Other authors [Ref. 271 also support the long wave theory.
Dauten and Valentine [Ref 28] believe that Kondratiev's long wave theory
has not been generally accepted by economists. They state that economic data, ex-
pressed in money terms (price data), does reflect fluctuations that correspond to
4 The Kondratiev long wave is named after Nikolai D. Kondratiev, the Russian economist
who is acknowledged for developing this theory in the 1920's. The actual paper that Kondratiev
published has been translated and printed in the journal, Review of Economic Statistics. [Ref. 261
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Kondratiev's long waves. However, the relationship was due to the inflation that oc-
curred during major wars. Dauten and Valentine suggest that this does not mean that
there were true waves in economic activity. They also note that there is no statistical
evidence in U.S. production data to suggest that there is any 50-60 year cycle.
Lee [Ref. 29] also believes there is no evidence to support the concept of
Kondratiev's long waves. He accepts the evidence that some segments of the economy
show signs of long movements in prices but as a whole there is no long general economic
cycle.
2. Psychological Theory of Technological Change
Discussion in this section focuses on the behavior of the individual as a result
of technological change in the work environment.
Fincham and Rhodes [Ref. 30] saw technology as an important, but not a prime
cause of worker behavior. Technology is viewed as just one of many interwoven forces
affecting work behavior. An individual's attitude towards work is shaped by his own
definitions created by factors external to the work environment. The general trends re-
garding worker attitudes towards work that were noted included: (1) The individual who
saw work as a source of income but gained little intrinsic value from the experience; and
(2) The individual who saw work as an overall positive experience. The individual who
only saw work as a source of income, work had become a means to other ends, like
family life and leisure activities. These worker- have a low expectation of their jobs and
use alternatives in their own lives to compensate. The individual who saw work as an
overall positive experience, needed work to achieve his own personal goals, ambitions,
and used the work environment as a social outlet.
Ktihlmann [Ref. 31] saw the pace of technological change increasing in the
world. Workers reactions to the changes vary from accepting, to tolerating, and finally
ouutirh, resistance. He saw this resistance as normal, a natural and universal part of the
human condition, as workers have always resisted changes that may threaten their ac-
customed way of life. However, in contrast in our everyday lives, most people welcome
certain types of change--things that have a certain novelty appeal. The absence of
change can also present problems for the worker. Individuals who remain in an unstim-
ulating environment for any lengthy period can experience a great deal of stress and
anxiety.
Ktlhlmann has developed a model to try and explain under what conditions in-
dividuals resist or accept technical change in the work environment. The model has five
propositions. They are:
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I. Employees will not resist change in the work environment if they believe the change
will help (or at least not hinder them) in possible future job advances. An employee
will resist change in the work environment if they believe (either real or imagined)
it as a threat to their interests.
2. Employees will support a change if they can confidently predict the implications the
change will have for them. Otherwise they will resist the change until they have
received enough information to make a decision one way or the other.
3. Employees will most likely support the change if they believe they have control
over the change. Thus minimizing or compensating for any negative affects.
4. Management can expect changes to be accepted to the degree that employees be-
lieve that no hindrance is made to established working habits and values.
5. Employees will accept the change if they are given the opportunity to try it on a
limited step-by-step basis. Introduction of a change too quickly will create stress
and workers will attempt to slow the pace down until eventually they control the
pace.
Another aspect regrading the individual is the increasing need for an awareness
of the effects of technological change by each individual. The growing humanist move-
ment 5 stresses that technology is a two-edged weapon, it has both good and bad effects.
Each individual must be aware of these effects if the final outcome of any change is to
be positive.
3. Sociological Theory and Technological Change
Though there is no one theory explaining the effects of technological change on
society it is probably the most important area of impact that needs to be understood.
A question that should accompany every turn that technology approaches, is "How will
this change affect society?" The discussion in this section relies heavily on the work of
sociologist Judson Landis. [Ref. 331
Society can be partitioned into component parts by many different taxonomies
such that components can and do overlap with each other. The following are four cri-
teria for distinguishing social components:
1. Differentiation by groups, both formal and informal. These cover both work and
social groups.
2. Differentiation by social class, bIased on the socio-economic status within society.
3. Differentiation by race, ethnicity, and sex.
4. Differentiation by institution. These include, family, religion, education, economic,
government, leisure, health care, and science.
5 For an interesting discussion of the issues, Bacard (Ref. 321 quotes some frightening facts
regarding the lack of awareness of individuals to some basic issues facing society.
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Within each of these components there will exist: (1) Norms, the shared stand-
ards for behavior; (2) The various status and roles that individuals and groups will have;
and (3) Culture, that complex set of customs, skills, habits, traditions, and knowledge
common to the members of the society.
Social change can be viewed as significant alteration in social relationships and
cultural ideas. It should be noted that social and cultural ideas are closely related and
either one can lead to the other. Technological change is one of the factors that can
cause social change. One has only to study the industrial revolution to see this point.
Recent technological innovations and inventions that have produced significant social
changes include; the contraceptive pill, the atom bomb, the airplane, and the computer.
However, it is not just the single innovations that can change a society, it can also be
the cumulative effects of many smaller innovations over time.
Social change is introduced into society through two processes; invention and
di asion. Invention introduces the new idea/product/object. Diffusion refers to the
spread of the ideaiproduct: object within the society. The majority of social change oc-
curs in the diffusion process.
Another important factor regarding the rate of social change is in the receptivity
of the society towards this change. In a society that has a rigid structure and emphasises
conformity, change will be slower. Whereas in a society that emphasises individualism
and self-determination, change will be faster. Various parts of a society will chang.- at
different rates. This has been referred to as a cultural lag, i.e., a new idea will be intro-
duced in one part of a society that will require a change in another part.
Social change can also occur through the collective behavior of individuals or
groups within a society--the social movement. Social movements will either promote or
resist a social change. Mass cormnunications has exposed the confusing issues of a
modern society to all parts of society. It allows individuals within one society to com-
municate with each other and with individuals in other societies thus spreading the issues
of the social movement.
Thus it can be seen that technological change will affect society at all levels and,
within each level, in several different ways. A study cannot simply isolate one area and
draw conclusions from this for the entire society. A thorough study of technological
change must consider society as a whole from a systems approach.
4. Organizational Theory and Technological Change
The discussion on organizational theory which follows is in two parts. The first
part--structure--discusses external factors that a firm will consider when implementing
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strategy and how these external factors may affect the overall structure of an organiza-
tion. The second part--labor--focuses on the specific effects of technological change on
how work is organized within an organization.
a. Structure
Galbraith and Kazanjian in their paper "Strategy, Technology, and Emerg-
ing Organizational Forms,' (Ref 34: pp. 29-41] suggest that there are many structures
available to a firm to choose from when implementing a new strategy. However each
structure will not achieve the same results. Thus, a firm must decide which structure will
best implement a given strategy. They concluded that firms must be responsive to spe-
cific factors, such as:
1. the degree of diversity within the chosen product-market strategy,
2. the extent and character of global competition within the industry, and
3. the requirements for technology development.
A list of design variables and their interactions with other design variables
as suggested by Galbraith and Kazanjian can be seen in Figure 3.6 Figure 3 shows that,
for a large multinational firm, the influence of these factors will determine the task di-
versity and uncertainty. This in turn determines and influences the other design vari-
ables. It is important that the combination of these decisions build a consistent design
for the organization. If one of the variables changes then the other variables must be
altered to maintain fit. If technology changes then all of the design variables may need
to change in order to maintain consistency. The system is thus in a state of continuing
adjustment.
Galbraith and Kazanjian also have noted that the specific role that tech-
nology takes has, in recent years, begun to change radically the basic character of com-
petition. Rapid changes in both product and process technologies have forced firms to
invest heavily in technology to remain competitive. Product life-cycles have shortened,
causing the basis of competition to shift from finance and marketing to product and
process innovations. Therefore, as the investments in R&D increase and because of the
advantages of economies of scale that technology offers, the emphasis has shifted to
more centrally directed and controlled R&D.
6 Design variables are really choices that an organization makes regarding its various functional
areas that are detailed in Figure 3.
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Power [Ref. 34: pp. 67-79] agreed with Galbraith and Kazanjian in that the
structure a firm adopts had a significant bearing on how successful the firm would be.
Power discussed the future in terms of the environment, technical systems, and strate-
gies. These equated to the factors Galbraith and Kazanjian indicate, that firms must
be responsive to, when designing their structure; i.e., globalization, technology, and
strategy.
Power suggested that in the future, organizations will be faced with a very
complex, information intense, and rapidly changing environment with a dependence on
advanced technologies. Managers will find it very hard to employ reactive management
practices. New and radically different technical systems will be installed within organ-
izations, with automation increasing its scope and diffusion within the work environ-
ment. For example, management information systems will be widely adopted in the
future. He concluded that the technological innovations that will have the largest
bearing on organizational structures in the future will be information processing, com-
munications and production technologies. Information technology will lead to a large
amount of information being available to management. Communication technologies
will enable communications with a wide variety of people both internal and external to
the organization. Future strategies will need to exploit opportunities, particularly with
regard to information technologies, for competitive advantage.
As shown in Table 3, Power offered several future organizational structures
as they relate to plausible scenarios about the future social and economic environment.
The scenarios and their related structures included:
1. A period of economic and social stability with slow economic growth would
produce structures like the hierarchical community structure and the homogeneous
democratic structure;
2. A period of chronic social and economic disruption would produce structures like
the hierarchical, replicated structure and the Skeletal, multi-function structure;
3. A conservative social environment and economic growth would produce structures
like the related, network structure and the extended, hierarchical structure.
In particular, Power believes that bureaucracies are on the decline and that more organic
structures are on the rise.
The most certain thing about the future and the structure of organizations
is that management will continue to experiment in the search for the structure which
gives the best results. Management will experiment with grouping people together into
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Table 3. SUMMARY OF ANTICIPATED ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES
Strrti,rtrl Elersent,
M 1ai0, C-.iern--lf Communication Afesueewuu.t Planning
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replhcateil operating g,,-erns. formal systems, automaied bonuses tonal planning
structure cii sOur ruI.iritig monitoring centralied prrtolho
"The Octopus" planning
Skeletal, multi Discrete, general Sh reid decision Portable, redundant, Even-oriented, Frequent.
function struLiure task units makllug, group streamlined equity contingency.
"The Mobile rep,,rting oriented planning
Related. nenvork Ambni-ibiis. Intrial repor- Accountiog oriented, Task completion I(ormal planing
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Tangled Web' le,, bosses poor links
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Source: Hage, J., (Ed.), Futures of Organizations: Innovaung to Adapt Strategy and
Human Resources to Rapid Technological Change, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books,
9SS.
new work units, creating and removing levels of management, and improving the so-
plistication of communication and information systems.
In discussing the future, Walk,-- [Ref. 35] believed the events from the recent
past provide guidance for future trends in organizational structure. He noted that spe-
cific trends within the framework of the economic, international, social, demographic,
and technological areas of the environment are often related. Walker discussed specific
trends as they related to each of the above enviromcntal areas and their relationship
with each other. He then highlighted. recent trends in U.S. organizations, which are
operating within this environment, believing that they may provide guidance for future
trends. Among the trends that Walker noted to be those that would have the largest
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impact on human resources were decentralization and downsizing. 7 Hie believes that
these smaller organizations will be able to sustain the greatest competitive advantage in
the future. This is consistent with other authors [Ref. 36] on organizational structure.
b. Labor
The discussion for this section is drawn from Fincham's and Rhodes'
monograph, The Individual, Work and Organization. [Ref. 30: pp. 183-195, 246-2591
Their discussion on how technological change may affect labor focuses on skill levels,
probable displacement and unemployment.
A debate arose, regarding the .;ffect of mechanization on labor, with the
industrial revolution. Marx in particular was very critical of mechanization. Ile believed
that the overall aim of the capitalist society was to increase productivit:y, with the long-
run aim to produce homogenous labor. Marx believed that mechanization would de-
grade the skill levels of jobs within an indus, and in addition create unemployment as
the number of workers displaced would be greater than the number of new jobs created
as a result of the overall expanding economy. Marx was also concerned that the worker
was enslaved to the machine because employers, who have invested heavily in machin-
erv, are anxious to use the machinery intensively before it becomes obsolete. In sum-
marn, Marx's concerns were that mechanization would deskill and displace labor, cause
high rates of unemployment, and result in work intensification.
Th. contrary opinion to this, presented by sociologists, such as Blauner, is
that technology has the potential to increase the skills of workers and the occipational
status of those who work with it. Ile saw worker alienation as only a passing phase and
that ultimately technology would be seen as a positive force.
These two opposing views are still alive when viewing today's technological
changes and are equally applicable across all sectors of the economy. Additional points
have stemmed from *his so-called deskilling debate and are likely to be considered for the
future effects of technology:
1. Possible polarization of the workforce, as more and more product;on workers are
replaced by automation and the emphasis shifts from blue-collar to white-collar
work;
2. Powerful new management information systems is threatening middle manage-
ments role. This may lead to more centralized power structures;
7 Decentraization is when a large company decentralizes its operating divisions. It is hoped
that, on their own, these divisions will operate more profitably. They have freedom to independ-
ently d-cide on pricing, manufacturing, marketing, distribution, and personnel policies. Downsizing
is what it says, downsizing the .ize of the divisions through the reduction of la1 -,r costs.
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3. Given the shift in employment towards the office, there will be an emphasis on
automating the office environment. This will have a consequence on the employ-
ment of women who currently fill a large percentage of the office positions.
C. CIVILIAN SECTOR FORECASTS
This section discusses the literature cn the civilian sector which encompasses a
broad range of topics. This review will not cover all of them. Only a select number of
topics are reviewed and have been reviewed under these two broad section headings: la-
bor force projections and industry forecasts. Within the later section the following in-
dustries were discussed: manufacturing, microelectronics, information technology, and
medical technology.
1. Labor Force Projections
Various organizations provide forecasts for the future based on current trends.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) is one such organization. Recent articles that
provide projections for the future out to the year 2000 and discussion on technological
change and its effects on the workforce, are discussed below.
Kutscher [Ref. 371 has provided an overview of the year 2000 making several
projections regarding the labor force, future growth, and employment and discussing
their implications. He has made several assumptions regarding these projections. They
are:
1. Work patterns will not charge significantly (e.g., the average length of the work-
week will not change significantly).
2. Broad social and educational trends will continue.
3. There will be no major war.
4. There will be no significant change in the size of the armed forces.
5. Fluctuations in economic activity will occur due to the business cycle.
Projections were made for three scenarios of low, moderate and high economic growth.
Only the moderate projections are discussed in the article.
The first set of projections made were for the labor force. Kutscher projects that
the labor force will expand by nearly 21 million (18 percent) during the period 1986-2000.
This represents both a slowing in the total numbers to be added and growth from the
previous 14 year period. This slowing trend is accounted for by the declining youth
population and the slowing participation rate of women. Kutscher notes that only 8.8
percent of the labor force growth will be white males. This means that minorities and
women will account for over 90 percent of the labor force growth. Another point raised
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is that 23 percent of the labor force growth will be immigrants. The number of 16 to
24 year-olds will continue to decline. In the year 2000 this group will number 31.5
million, down from 34 million in 1986 and 37 million in 1979. The younger half of this
group (16-19 year-olds) will decline until 1992 to about 7.4 million and then rise to 8.8
million by 2000.
The implications of these projections include an increase the use of other
sources of labor (i.e., immigrants and the retired) as a result of the declining youth. The
military and colleges will be affected as they have an interest in the youth population.
Businesses that target the youth population will also be affected. The large percentage
of minorities and women will provide challenges, especially minorities who traditionally
have fewer skills and higher unemployment rates. The entrance of migrants has impli-
cations as the majority will not speak English and most will not possess the skills nec-
essary for the faster growing occupations. This may cause a mismatch of skills as
low-skilled minority and immigrant workers search for employment and employers
search for high-skilled employees.
The Gross National Product (GNP) is projected to increase 40 percent during
the period 1986-2000. This is an annual growth rate of 2.4 percent, slightly down from
2.5 percent for the previous 14 year period. This growth is much greater than that of
the labor force and can be attributed to increased productivity. Productivity growth is
attributed to several factors that include a more mature, experienced, and educated work
force, stable energy prices and an increase in the capital-labor ratio. The composition
of GNP is expected to change.
Employment is expected to expand by 21 million jobs or 19 percent between
1986 and 2000. This is a 1.3 percent increase and is slower than the previous 14 year
period where it was 2.2 percent. Service-producing industries will account for nearly all
of the projected growth. A breakdown by industry of the distribution of employment
growth within the service-producing sector is shown at Table 4. A point to note is that
growth in the finance, insurance, and real estate industries is slowing down considerably
when compared with the previous 14 year period where growth was 2.4 million jobs.
The biggest contributors to job growth in the service industries will be health-care and
business services. Finally, the growth within government will be attributed to the state
and local governments rather than the federal government.
Employment in manufacturing will decline by more than 800,000 jobs. How-
ever, 15 percent of all wage and salary employment will be in manufacturing. Employ-
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Table 4. EMPLOYMENT GROWTH WITHIN SERVICE-PRODUCING SEC-
TOR: Projection is for the period 1986-2000. Total job growth in the









Source: Kutscher, R.E., "An Overview of the Year 2000," Occupational Outlook Quar-
terlv, p. 6, Spring 1988.
ment gains within some manufacturing industries include; printing and publishing, drugs
and pharmaceutical's, computers, plastic products and instrument industries.
The implication of employment gains in one sector and losses in another sector
is the continuing displacement of labor. The continuing changes in the service-
producing sector also has some implications. Many of the firms in this sector will be
small and usually smaller firms have higher turnover rates and are less likely to give
lifetime employment. Therefore, workers will have to be prepared through education
and training for more frequent changes in employment. Another implication is, as both
the younger workers decline in numbers and the percentage of women seeking full-time
work increases, a probable shortage of workers in those industries that require large
numbers of part-time employees will emerge. These industries have traditionally em-
ployed younger workers and women. These factors may lead to a reversal of the decline
of the average working hours per week.
Projections for employment by occupation show that the share of jobs for which
workers have at least one year of college will increase. The share of jobs for which most
workers have completed high school will decline slightly, and the share of jobs for which
most workers have less than high school education will decline more sharply. These
projections have important consequences for education. Those people with only a high
school education will find it more difficult to find suitable employment that will provide
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an opportunity for advancement. A point to note is that among the workers who have
less than a high school education, it is the minorities who number the most.
In his article in the Monthly Labor Review, Personick [Ref. 38] has projected in-
dustry output and employment for the year 2000. His projections are consistent with
Kutscher's. However, he does have some interesting additional points. He notes that
the modest decline in manufacturing employment masks a pronounced occupational
shift within the industry to more highly-skilled jobs. He also notes that health care
continues to be one of the most important and growing industries within the economy,
reporting II percent of the GNP in 1987. Growth in the private health services industry
is projected to increase from 7.1 million in 1988 to 10.1 million by 2000. This represents
one in every 12 jobs. This increasing demand for health care is being fuelled in the main
by new technologies, and to a lesser extent, the increasingly aged population. Because
of technological advances in medicine, patients will be receiving more tests and inter-
vention will be possible for diseases that were previously incurable. This leads to accel-
eration in the use of sophisticated and expensive new equipment, labor-intensive acute
care, and multiple doctors' visits. It is not surprising that seven out of the ten fastest
growing occupations during the period 1988-2000 are health related.
Silvestri and Lukasiewicz [Ref. 39] have made projections on possible changes
within the occupational structure of the economy as shown in Table 5. The numbers
in the table agree with the arguments presented by Personick. The occupations that re-
quire at least one year of college (the top three occupational groups listed in Table 5)
all show increases in overall employment. Occupations that require a high school level
education (the middle four occupational groups listed in Table 5) show both slight in-
creases and declines in overall employment. Occupations that do not require a high
school education (the bottom two occupational groups listed in Table 5) sho'-' a decline
in overall employment.
Silvestri and Lukasiewicz conducted an analysis of the occupational structure
within the service-producing sector and found that the three top groups with the highest
educational levels are expected to increase their share of employment at the expense of
the lower educa:ed workers.
The final paper reviewed in this section is another BLS paper by Mark. [Ref.
40] He has presented some results of BLS research into the effects of technological
change. This work began in the 1950's and has produced over 35 reports on the effects
within various industries. The major findings listed in the paper were:
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Tablk 5. EMPLOYMENT BY MAJOR OCCUPATIONAL GROUP: For 1988
and projected for 2000. Note that numbers are in thousands.
OCCUPATIONAL TITLE 1988 2000
Number Percent Number Percent
Total, all occupations 118,104 100.0 136,211 100.0
Executive, administrative, and 12,104 10.2 14,762 10.8
managerial occupations
Professional specialty occupa- 14,628 12.4 18,137 13.3
tions
Technicians and related support 3,867 3.3 5,089 3.7
occupations
Marketing and sales occupa- 13,316 11.3 15,924 11.7
tions
Administrative support occupa- 21,066 17.8 23,553 17.3
tions, including clerical
Service Occupations 18,479 15.6 22,651 16.6
Agricultural, forestry, fishing, 3,503 3.0 3,334 2.4
and related occupations
Precision production, craft, and 14,159 12.0 15,563 11.4
repair occupations
Operators, fabricators, and la- 16,983 14.4 17,198 12.6
borers
Source: Silvestri, G., and Lukasiewicz, J., "Outlook 2000: Projections of Occupational
Employment, 1988-2000," Monthly Labor Review, p. 43, November 1989.
1. The pace of introduction of new technology appears to be increasing in many in.
dustries as these industries modernize to reduce costs and compete more effectively
in domestic and overseas markets.
2. In general, relatively few employees have been laid off because of technological
change.
3. Industries that lead in the adoption of new technology generally are among those
with above-average rates of productivity growth.
4. New technologies are helping to change the structure of occupations.
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5. Measures have been undertaken to facilitate the orderly introduction of new tech-
nology. The three most important measures were:
* Provide advance notice to workers affected by the new technology;
• Coordinate labor adjustment with technical planning;
* Provide employees with new skills associated with modem technology and re-
train those displaced for other work.
Mark drew several conclusion from these findings. First, he expects the occu-
pational structure will continue to experience changes in the future. Second, techno-
logical change displaces few workers but it is more likely to create dislocations. Finally,
professional and technical occupations are on the rise and lower skilled occupations are
on the decline.
2. Industry Projections
This section reviewed the literature specific to selected industries. They were:
manufacturing, microelectronics, information technology, and medical technology.
a. Alanufacturing
This section focuses on literature dealing with technological change in the
manufacturing industry. Wall, et al., [Ref. 10) present a series of papers on the impact
of advanced manufacturing technologies on personnel issues. The spectrum of topics
discussed on advanced manufacturing technologies range from implications for the in-
dividual on the shop floor, through to the effects for the organizational s-ructure of a
firm.
Wall and Kemp in their paper, The Nature and Implications of Advanced
Manufacturing Technologv: Introduction, [Ref. 10: pp. 1-141 discuss some of the early
thinking on the work and organizational implications of advanced manufacturing tech-
nology. The introduction of the computer numerical control machine tools and robots
into manufacturing has given rise to two concerns. First, by virtue of their capacity to
be programmed, there is a concern that the skill could be removed from traditional jobs
by wresting direct control over the production process from the shopfloor employee.
The second concern is that the historical trend to deskill shopfloor work could mean
management would capitalize on the opportunities the new technology offers and divide
the ncw computing, program editing, maintenance and other required skills among
groups of specialists, taking them out of the hands of the machine operators.
These concerns have been confirmed with empirical evidence. In contrast,
there is other empirical evidence that suggests technology can be introduced in ways that
do not deskill, and other evidence that shows jobs can be deskilled and enriched, de-
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pending on the decisions made about the implementation of the new technology. This
indicates that there is a choice regarding the implementation of technology which will
have implications for both quality of working life and productivity.
Cummings and Blumberg in their paper, Advanced Manufacturing Technol-
ogy and Work Design, [Ref. 10: pp. 37-60] examined the link between advanced manu-
facturing technology and work design. They concluded that organizations need to
design appropriate work structures to operate the new forms of technology. As a result
of empirical evidence from three case studies they concluded that the new forms of
technology tended to increase technical interdependence and uncertainty and environ-
mental dynamics. To meet these challenges they suggested the use of self-regulating
work groups, composed of multi-skilled employees who can jointly control technical and
environmental variances. It was pointed out that such designs call for employees with
growth and social needs and may require the upgrading of employee skills, changing se-
lection practices, training programs, reward systems and management practices.
In her paper, Selection and Training for Advanced Manufacturing
Technology, Rothwell [Ref. 10: pp. 61-82] has noted considerable evidence in her analysis
of the British manufacturing industry of rapid change in the labor force. This evidence
had resulted from the interaction of the economy, technology, and the decision making
within organizations and included external observations of high unemployment and high
levels of skill shortages and internal observations within organizations. The internal
evidence was summarized into three points: [Ref. 10: pp. 79-80]
1. Certain groups of low-skill workers become increasingly marginalized, either by
being depleted in numbers or made readily interchangeable and substitutable
through the skills being in the computer system
2. Higher-skill professionals become a mobile craft workforce of high-fliers who move
on where pay or greater interest is on offer. They have little expectation or real-
ization of career progression with a particular employer.
3. A core of line managers, maintenance technicians, and skilled operators become
essential to the development, implementation, and operation of new technology
mainstream of the business. They can be selected, trained and managed in a variety
of different ways that is determined more by management policies (or their absence)
than the technology alone (itself also a result of certain designs and managerial
choices).
Burnes and Fitter in their paper, Control of Advanced Manufacturing Tech-
nology: Supervision Without Supervisors?, [Ref. 10: pp. 83-99] continue the argument,
introduced by Wall and Kemp above, that the introduction of the new technologies will
either lead to greater centralization of control (i.e., more rigid bureaucratic structures
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with less discretion for those at the lower end of the organization), or, the opposite, de-
centralization and delegation of authority. They concluded that there is no general
agreement on how the supervisor's role will develop in the future or the impact the new
technology will have.
It is clear, however, that the traditional role of supervisors as man-managers
who supervise the performance of the personnel on the shopfloor has changed and will
continue to do so. Though the motivational element of encouraging better performance
by discouraging negative behavior is still present. Burnes and Fitter concluded that the
supervisor's role is changing to one of handling more system problems that, more often
than not, result from machine failure and not human error. This change in emphasis is
the result of the increased complexity of the technology used in the production process
and the interdependence of each stage. The push for greater efficiency has resulted in
tighter controls along with reduced stock levels of raw and intermediate materials. This
has led to the increased need for supervisory control to monitor a production plan and
to initiate the correct adjusting actions when necessary. [Ref. 10: p. 951
An important question is how much of the supervisory control is handled
by the supervisor and how much by microelectronic systems. Burns and Fitter noted
the increased ability of top management to monitor the decisions and interventions made
by supervisors increases the tendency for supervisors to be cautious and may they not
tak: the risk in using their discretion. "Because of their relatively low status, supervisors
can be reluctant to take responsibility for overriding the system, even when it would be
desirable .... [Ref. 10: p. 95]
Burns and Fitter concluded, as no evidence existed to suggest that the
supervisor's job could be automated, the supervisors job should be enhanced to include
those skills necessary to use the new technology as an aid to human decision making.
In addition the supervisor would need inter-personal skills for negotiating access to the
support services necessary for the maintenance for the production process.
Bessant and Senker in their paper, Societal Implications of Advanced Manu-
facturing Technology, [Ref. 10: pp. 153-1711 discussed the Kondratiev long wave theory
and indicated that information technology met the criteria specified by the theory to be
judged as a major technological force. Bessant and Senker noted that information tech-
nology has made significant contributions to the automation of manufacturing proc-
esses.
The other topic noted by Bessant and Senker was, in general, as production
is automated the demand for new skills increases but, if the process is also less labor-
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intensive, the number of high-skilled people required is lower. In addition, the impor-
tance of prevention of machine breakdown and the reduction in repair time increases.
This has implications for maintenance personnel. Bessant and Senker used an example
from a West German factory [Ref. 10: pp. 157-158] to highlight the importance of
maintenance. In this plant that was making airframes for Tornado fighter aircraft there
were 28 machining centres of various kinds. They were linked in a flexible manufactur-
ing system whose total cost exceeded 50 million pounds. This level of capital investment
required a very high degree of utilization. Maintenance played a key role in ensuring
that stoppages were kept to an absolute minimum. An analysis of downtime conducted
over a period of 6,000 operating hours for 24 of the machines which had run on a
three-shift continuous basis revealed stoppages for various reasons. The breakdown re-
vealed: 56 percent were for maintenance and repair; 13 percent for routine maintenance
and inspection; 17 percent for facility improvement; and 14 percent of stoppages were
attributed to non-technical causes. The stoppages for maintenance and repair had a
breakdown of. 22 percent for reaction time; 20 percent for diagnoses; 9 percent for the
supply of replacement parts; 40 percent for repair and overhaul; and 9 percent for
resumption of operations.
This example highlights the importance of the maintenance personnel. The
conclusions from the study that were noted by Bessant and Senker were the more com-
plex and automated the systems, the higher the skill levels of maintenance specialists
need to be to ensure reasonable failure rates and the ability to conduct improvements
to facilities. Another conclusion was that the lower the personnel levels were (pro-
duction with automated facilities), the broader the educational background of these
workers (operators and maintenance) had to be.
In general, employment in manufacturing is falling but the requirements for
those who remain is increasing. The transition from old technology to advanced manu-
facturing technology yields a comparison of the pattern of work between the present
factory and the factory of the future as shown in Table 6. The transition from the
present to the future is far from smooth. There are difficulties keeping up with the in-
creased training requirements and compensating for the growing shortages of skilled
personnel in the labor market, particularly at the college level. This places increased
stress on firms to sub-contract or bolster training to grow their own. Sub-contracting
produces its own problems of reliable and timely service and lack of familiarity of the
sub-contractor with the equipment.
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Table 6. PATITERNS OF WORK IN PRESENT AND FUTURE FACTORIES
PRESENT PATTERN FACTORY OF THE FUTURE
Single Skills Multiple Skills
Demarcation Blurring of Boundaries
Rigid working practices Flexible working practices
Operation mainly by direct intervention Mainly supervision of advanced oper-
ations
High division of labour Moves towards teamwork
Low local autonomy High local autonomy and devolution of
responsibility
Training given low priority Training and organizational development
given high priority
Source: Wall, T.D., Clegg, C.W., and Kemp, N.J., The Human Side of Advanced Man-
ufacturing Technology , p. 162, Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1987.
Clegg and Corbett [Ref. 10: pp. 173-195] conclude that the human aspects
of advanced manufacturing technology will remain important for the foreseeable future.
As the manufacturing systems increase ir sophistication, complexity and size, they will
need the support of highly trained, coordinated, and well-managed operators, engineers,
planners, programmers, and managers. The systems will also need to be designed so
operators can understand them and thus ensure satisfactory performance. As pro-
duction environments become more uncertain, problem solving abilities and the capa-
bility to employ them flexibly and effectively increase in importance. The emerging
emphasis on integrated systems cuts across existing organizational structures. This
interdependence is leading to a tighter coupling of activities. The opportunities this of-
fers for improving performance will only emerge if organizational structures are designed
to allow for information flow and control. Clegg and Corbett concluded that the new
manufacturing processes make the human aspects more important and that they need
to be carefully considered and consistently designed. [Ref. 10: p. 180]
b. Microelectronics
Sir Ieuan Maddock in his book The Microelectronics Revolution described
microelectronics as "... 'The most remarkable technology ever to confront mankind'.....
[Ref. 41: p. 1] Central to this revolution is the silicon chip that measures less than 10
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millimetres square (one inch equals 25.4 millimetres). The silicon chip contains compli-
cated electronic circuitry and can be used as either the central processing unit or the
memory to a computer. "The reasons for believing the silicon chip to be the cause of
another industrial revolution are to do with its cost, capability, and versatility." [Ref.
41: p. 1]
An analysis was conducted by IBM (International Business Machines) on
several of their best computers to assess the improvements in the processing time and
costs for 1700 typical sequential processing operations. They found that processihg time
had been reduced from 47 seconds to four seconds over the period 1960 to 1975 and this
time has reduced even further to below one second in 1990. The processing costs had
reduced from S2.48 in 1960 to 20 certs in 1975 and had reduced to below five cents in
1990. .An analysis of memory capacity versus cost is even more astounding. In 1973 the
cost for one kilobyte of memory was about S50,000, in 1983 64 kilobytes cost about
S500, and in 1990 1024 kilobytes cost S60. [Ref. 42]
The applications of the silicon chip have proved to be enormous. In 1981
over 100,000 products had microprocessors built into them. The market has continued
to grow with the quantity and complexity of applications increasing rapidly with virtu-
ally every industry and household a potential user. [Ref. 43: p.171] It does not take long
to realize how much the silicon chip has become a part of society. The appliances we
have in our homes, i.e. microwaves, electric clocks, stereo components, and VCR's, are
examples. "Beyond this the microelectronic technology is being used on a massive scale
in shops, offices, banks, hospitals, and factories." [Ref. 41: p. 3]
Francis notes then that this new technology has had three impacts on our
lives:
1. It has improved existing products through either improved specification or price
or both.
2. It has created entirely new products and markets.
3. It is having a major impact on work. First, there is a shift in employment from
the factory to the office and leisure and service related industries. Second there is
an increasing proportion of white-collar employment in industry as a result of the
work becoming less routine. Finally there are various types of workers being dis-
placed. [Ref. 41: pp. 3-41
Francis focuses on the last impact listed above. He saw four main debates
surfacing as a result of the introduction of microelectronics. [Ref. 41: pp. 5-7] The first
debate is that new technology is so enormously labor-saving that we will never again
need full employment to satisfy all our needs. The second debate concerns the impact
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on skills which will be required of workers in the future. Francis saw two possible sce-
narios regarding the impact on skills, either; (a) to deskill the workforce, destroying craft
occupations, and fragmenting jobs into meaningless elements which can be performed
by unskilled operators controlled by large-scale bureaucracies; or (b) automated ma-
chinery and systems will take over all the routine tasks, and thus the impact of the new
technology will be to require a more highly educated and trained workforce to perform
complex tasks which need a high level of human decision-making skill--such jobs will
give autonomy and variety to the worker. Thus, the second debate revolves around the
question of whether the new technology will lead to predominately high skill or low skill
divisions of labor. The third debate centers around how jobs will be organized in the
future. Will there be mainly large firms or will there be an abundance of smaller firms?
What will the structures of these firms look like? Will they continue to look like the
traditional bureaucratic organization or will they adopt a flatter structure, employing
concepts like peer-group or clan-type organizations? The final debate that Francis raises
concerns the possible shift to a short-term view of employment by professionals, i.e. if
skills are specific to a particular occupation rather than a firm, why should either em-
ployer or employee prefer a long-term contract with one employer rather than a
consultancy contract for a particular piece of work.
In assessing the first debate Francis sees the argument split dowA the middle
with those who believe that there will be massive unemployment as a result of the new
technologies and those who believe the opposite, that the new technologies will enhance
employment opportunities. [Ref. 41: pp. 14-231 The economic theory underlying the
optimistic view is termed compensation theory. It argues that the level of employment
in the economy is, in the long-run, determined by the overall level of demand in the
economy. The introduction of the new technology will lead to increases in demand
which will lead to more jobs. These new jobs compensate for any job loss created as a
result of the introduction of the new technology. The pessimists view coined by a fa-
mous economist, Wassily Leontief, is that the machine will always be cheaper and thus
the level of unemployment will increase as the worker is replaced by the machine. A
third view was also discussed that focused on a cyclical pattern to the way in which
technical developments arise. It is suggested that patterns (or long-waves) of economic
development occur with 50 to 60 years periodicity. They are referred to as Kontratiev
waves.
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The notion is that a major innovation, or set of innovations, at a particular point
in time is exploited by the ability and initiative of entrepreneurs to create new op-
portunities for profit. These in turn attract a swarm of imitators who exploit the
new opening with a wave of new investment, generating boom conditions. As the
innovations mature there will be a period of stagnation and depression, with subse-
quent high unemployment, if or until a new wave of innovations comes along to
compensate. [Ref. 41: p. 22]
This theory was also uutlined by Wall, et al. [Ref. 10] Francis argued that, according
to the theory, we should be now entering a period recession.
Francis concluded from the discussion of the debate over the future levels
of employment, that:
... there is no reason why the new technology should inevitably mean a massive re-
duction in employment. Current high levels of unemployment can be accounted for
without recourse to an explanation from technology; consumer appetite for yet more
goods and services still appears to be insatiable; ... at the present the likelihood is
that it [the new technology] will cause labour shortages rather than an overall labour
surplus. jRef. 41: p. 231
The analysis of the debate as to whether the new technology will lead to the
deskilling of the workforce or enhance the skills required was seen more in the light of
those philosophical and political underpinnings of tloe theorists. Those authors who
adopted the deskilling side are those who have misgivings about the capacity of
capitalism to produce outcomes that are favourable to all citizens. The opposite view
is shared by those who are confident that a suitable combination of market forces and
judicial government action, when market forces fail, will produce a favourable outcome.
[Ref. 41: p. 29-30]
After much discussion and analysis of three case studies Francis rejects the
deskilling theory. As a result of the introduction of new technology in some instance
"jobs are deliberately de-skilled as part of a management strategy to tighten control and
reduce costs. In others, ... management have deliberately reduced tightness of their
control and attempted to enhance skill-levels." [Ref. 41: p. 1021 Francis concluded there
were three reasons why manage.i-ent would enhance a job after the introduction of the
new technology:
I. A belief that deskilling is counter productive, i.e., it lowers morale, comnitment,
motivation, and is not an optimum use of human resources.
2. A belief they had to enhance the job to attract and keep suitable labor.
3. Because of legislation requiring jobs to be of a certain quality. [Ref. 41: p. 102-103]
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The last two debates that Francis's book raises regarding organizational
structure and size, are very complex and very speculative. Francis concluded [Ref. 41:
p. 2041 if an advance in technology lead to higher skill levels and higher earnings for the
entire labor force then the sources for capital will increase. Also with technological ad-
vance comes the possibility of exploiting market niches and this becomes the focus for
management rather than the labor process. In both cases the need to maintain mana-
gerial hierarchies for controlling and exploiting labor is reduced. Therefore sub-
contracting, use of products from small contractors, and free-lancing are likely to grow.
In addition, new technologies are likely to be used by organizations to run parts of the
overall opera -ion, thus increasing the pressure on organizations to become smaller and
to use contracting.
c. Information Technology
Kraut, in Technology and the Transformation White-Collar Work, [Ref. 44]
assembled a series of papers that explored the impacts that information technology has
had on white-collar work as it finds it's way into more and more work environments.
Kraut notes that in about 1980 the cost (per hour) of computer time became cheaper
than the cost of a person's time, thus beginning the information revolution. "As infor-
mation becomes cheaper to collect, produce,transform and distribute, more of us will
be both information workers ...-- the people who do the collection, production, trans-
formation, and distribution--and information consumers. [Ref 44: p. 21
Kraut highlights an important cffect of the resulting workplace changes in
that women's employment levels are affected more than that of men. He notes over the
long term the impact of information technology has "the potential to alter the nature
of managerial, professional, and clerical work ..., to date the influence has been the
strongest on clerical work. And clerical work is women's work. According to 1982 U.S.
Labor Department figures, 85°Y/ of clerical workers were women, and over 95% of some
clerical job categories, such as secretary, receptionist, typist, and telecommunications
operator, were held by women (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1983)." [Ref. 44: p. 4]
In 1988 women constituted 45 percent of the work force, this figure is
projected to increase to 47 percent by 2000. In addition, in 1988 administrative support
occupations, that include clerical, accounted for 17.8 percent of the work force, this fig-
ure is expected to decline to 17.3 percent by 2000. [Ref. 37: pp. 67-69] Thus, if the par-
ticipation rates of women are increasing but the typical entry level jobs, i.e. clerical, are
decreasing this would seem to confirm the point that Kraut has made.
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Kraut discussed previous literature and studies that attempted to seek clear
cut descriptions of the effects of technological change on both blue- and white-collar
workers. He found a central theme running through much of the discussion in that the
effects of technological change on employment depended on the interaction between
changes in productivity, changes in demand, and changes in other historical and social
factors.
Kraut discussed the argument that automation leads to increased produc-
tivity, which in turn decreases production costs. This in turn may stimulate demand
which would create more jobs. The other side of this debate is that automation will re-
duce the number of initial jobs. This situation leads to the question of whether the
subsequent increased demand, as a result of the increased productivity, will create new
jobs to offset tihe initial reduction in the workforce. Kraut presents arguments from
other authors that disagree with the concept that automation will stimulate job growth
in the long-run, believiiig that automation will lead to higher rates of unemployment.
These authors argue that the current economic climate is different from previous ones
and therefore any previous analyses are irrelevant. They noted that for the past three
economic recoveries the level of structural unemployment 8 has risen. With current levels
of structural unemployment at seven to ei.ht percent the economy may not absorb those
workers displaced by automation. Some components of the population, particularly the
aged, minorities, unskilled and the under-educated, may not participate in the benefits
of productivity. In addition, current automation may demand such high skill-levels and
general training that some workers may be locked out of the labor force. [Ref. 44: p.
12]
Chamot [Ref. 44: pp. 23-33] said the introduction of information technology
into the office could lead to a number of labor related problems. They included the de-
skilling and rationalization of work, increased stress associated with poor ergonomics,
computer pacing of work, job speed-ups, excessive monitoring of work by computers,
and the exploitation of workers who work from home using computers and telecommu-
nications equipment. Chamot noted that these concerns regarding job security and
working conditions are the result of decisions made by equipment and software designers
and by managers. He concluded that many of these problems can be avoided if active
participation by employee representatives is sought early in the change process.




The one factor that has, and is likely to continue to influence medicine more
than any other single factor is technology. The Surgeon General of the U.S. Navy, Vice
Admiral J.A. Zimble in a recent interview [Ref. 45] was asked about the nature of Navy
medicine in the future. He was unable to give a clear answer to the question because of
the difficulty in assessing the trends in future health care. Technological advances in
health care are occurring each day. He quoted an example of equipment (Magnetic
Resonance Imaging) that was unheard of 10 years ago but today is widely used. He
believes that total medical knowledge is doubling every three and a half years.
From BLS research [Ref. 39] it was noted that additional requirements for
medical personnel have grown and will continue to grow with increased specialization,
along with higher levels of utilization. History has shown that once a discipline within
medicine is defined, then more focused study creates more specialization. The trend
continues to accelerate the need for even more highly differentiated skills for all catego-
ries of medical personnel. The BLS confirms this trend by reporting that half of the 20
occupations with the fastest projected growth rates for the year 2000 are health-service
occupations. [Ref. 39: p. 50]
Future technologies will result in more expensive care. When new methods
of treatment are implemented, they usually are added to existing standards of care,
rather than replacing older procedures. Former medical director of California Blue
Shield, Doctor Ralph Schaffarzick noted that ideally, technology should lower costs.
However, this is not the case as the technology is usually expensive and the utilization
is high because doctors and the public want access to all the newest things. [Ref. 46]
Therefore, instead of substituting capital for labor, new technology requires additional
manpower in the same manner.
D. MILITARY FORECASTS
Literature regarding the military and technological change covers a broad range of
topics. The literature reviewed has therefore been structured under several broad subject
headings that include: Policy; Future Battlefield; Manpower; Technology; Military
Medicine, and Defense Industry.
1. Policy
In November 1988 the then Secretary for Defense, Frank Carlucci made an ad-
dress titled Technology and National Security in the 21st Century. [Ref. 47] Carlucci saw
a discussion on technology as a discussion about the future. He saw technology as
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playing a central role in ensuring the U.S. national security. Technology has played the
central role in balancing the U.S. against the Soviet Union. The U.S. has used its tech-
nological superiority to offset the Soviets superior numbers, i.e., quality for quantity.
It follows then that there is a reliance on smarter soldiers and officers and the need for
the best equipment. Carlucci saw that the U.S. was ten years ahead technologically and
that the U.S. needed to stay there.
He went on to discuss three technologies that he believed were the building
blocks to further advances in the future. They were; stealth technology,
superconductivity, and SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative) technologies.
Carlucci wanted to develop the technological potential to the maximum strate-
gic advantage. He believed there were four factors that would influence whether the
advantage could be maintained. First, the requirement for the U.S. to prevent some
technologies from falling into the wrong hands. Second, the U.S. needs to maintain close
communications with allies who are closing the technological gap. Third, the U.S. needs
to sustain a healthy defense industrial base. Finally, the U.S. must devote significant
R&D funds to the continuing development of technological research.
Carlucci saw that the pace of technological change was quickening and this was
particularly evident in military technologies. He even postulated that such advances
could fundamentally change the nature of war.
David Harvey, [Ref. 48] in his article The Army's MANPRINT Program, out-
lines the U.S. Army's policy for the design of future weapon systems. 9 The need for such
a policy came about after several new weapon systems were introduced and turned out
to be maintenance disasters. The ultimate aim of the program is driven by the strategic
desire to go for a lower mental class of personnel since this class of recruit is more
available than higher quality recruits.
The objectives of MANPRINT are fourfold.
1. To influence the materiel system design for optimum system performance by con-
sidering human factors, manpower, personnel and training, safety, and health be-
fore allocating functions;
2. To assure that the materiel system and concepts conform to the capabilities and
limitations of a trained soldier;
9 The policy is known as MANPRINT (MANpower and PeRsonnel INTegration). For a
more detailed account of the MANPRINT system, Ref. 49 provides such an account. The U.S.
Navy has a similar program called HARDMAN (HARDware versus MANpower).
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3. To assist training; and
4. To improve life cycle costs for man/machine systems.
2. The Future Battlefield
The U.S. Army's current war-fighting doctrine is the Airland Battle. What is
being done to prepare for the future battle? A number of authors have discussed the
U.S. Army's concept for the future battlefield--kno,%n as ARMY 21.
In an address to a symposium held in June 1985 and titled Education and
Training Practices: 2010 and Beyond, [Ref. 50] Colonel David Miller (U.S. Army) of
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) outlined the U.S. Army's concept for the
future battlefield known as ARMY 21. It is only a concept and is intended to give the
Army long-range planning advice for the period 2000-2025.
In considering this future concept TRADOC has made several assumptions re-
garding the future environment. TRADOC has assumed: (1) The balance of power be-
tween the U.S. and the Soviets will remain uncertain; (2) There will continue to be
political and economic upheavals around the world; (3) Energy sources will continue to
be an issue; (4) New technologies will continue to influence; (5) There will be continuing
social and demographic pressures. From these assumptions certain implications re-
garding the Army, could be made about the future. Firstly, TRADOC saw that the Army
must be prepared to fight arid win anywhere in the world. Secondly, weapon parity will
be dependant on technology. Thirdly, there is a need to avoid a decisive engagement.
Fourth was that the first battle will be critical. Finally, there will be a need for strategic
mobility.
The actual future battlefield will be expanded into space and will extend from
the U.S. support areas, deep into the support areas of the enemy. It will be intensive and
most likely chemical and highly electronic. The weapon systems will be very lethal, i.e.,
they will have a high probability of first hit and massive conventional destructive power.
Command and control will be very difficult as a result of the other characteristics.
Finally, no one weapon system will dominate.
TRADOC forecasts the future Army environment as having fewer people with
a wider variety of skills. The equipment used will be more sophisticated with an in-
creasing dependence on computer-driven systems. This would have implications for in-
creased training time and cost for personnel.
The essence of the ARMY 21 is to conduct a style of war in which agility, de-
ception, maneuver, and firepower are used to face the enemy with a succession of dan-
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gerous and unexpected situations more rapidly than he can react to them. Initiative is
the key to achieving this. The offensive spirit and independent action by subordinates
to exploit the enemy is the goal.
The characteristics of the structures that will be ARMY 21 are self-sufficiency,
high mobility, firepower intensive, less manpower reliant, agile, and capable of contin-
uous operations. The soldier will still remain the key to combat power. It is likely that
extensive use of robots will be made and an electronic warfare capability will be built-in
to all combat forces. They will also have the capability to obtain an abundance of
real-time intelligence. The support requirements for this force will emphasise mobility,
modular replacement, redundant systems, built-in-test equipment, automated repair ca-
pabilities, and light weight.
The high technology equipment will demand better training for both the opera-
tors and maintainers. Equipment designers will consider the man first and then the
machine afterwards. It is possible that future soldiers may be less mechanically inclined
and that the advanced technology will reduce the required soldier skill levels. The com-
bination of the battlefield environment and the high technology equipment will increase
stress for the individual soldiers and commanders.
Numerous people have provided comments and opinions on the ARMY 21
concept and its ideas of the future battlefield. General John Wickham, [Ref. 511 Chief
of Staff of the U.S. Army in 1987 predicted that despite the flood of high technology
electronic systems and lethal new weapon systems into the modem army, it was still the
physically fit and highly trained foot soldier who will continue to be the key to future
combat operations. In addition Wickham emph sed the importance of command,
control, communications, and information systems (C31) to future operations.
Admiral Carlisle Trost, [Ref. 52] Chief of U.S. Naval Operations in 1987, did
not accept the notion that the 21st century would override the human element. On the
contrary, he predicted that the advanced weapon systems of the future would continue
to need high quality people to operate and maintain them. Good decision making would
be required at all levels to make split second decisions and he emphasised the leadership
challenge that faced the military in the future. He believed a key issue for the future
would be C31 systems.
Rose, Peters and Pandolfo, [Ref. 53] developed a picture of what the U.S. Army
would look like in 2010 and indicated that technology must continue to be applied to
enhance individual soldier and unit skills. They agreed with the ARMY 21 concept as
the right direction. They emphasised continued R&D to help keep the technological
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advantage and saw that the Army will rely heavily on their superiority of strategic in-
sight, skill, and creativity to outwit their enemies rather than increased defense expendi-
tures.
Timmerman [Ref 541 acknowledged that man was the primary concern and
target in war, but noted that there was a reluctance to make him the center of any war-
fighting forecasts. Timmerman indicated that it is man wbo should take center stage as
the future scenarios are postulated. He dismissed the notion that there was no place for
man on the future battlefield as technologically advanced systems are developed. He
predicted that the increased presence of advanced weapon systems in the future will shift
the emphasis from physical strength to one of psychological strength, though physical
strength will still be needed. This places new bounds on what the soldier of the future
will look like. He saw an increased emphasis of the social role of the soldier. This role
should be redefined so the soldier serves as a model of psychological resistance and
strength rather than as a model of physical resistance. Therefore there is a need for de-
veloping psychological defenses, inoculating soldiers against real and induced stress, and
ensuring that a soldiers confidence is sustained. The physical role will still be needed and
this can be enhanced by employing technology to extend the soldier's natural biological
capabilities. The aim will be to send forward future warriors surrounded by protecting
robots and remote control aircraft that would be responsive to every biological com-
mand. This capability would create a truly revolutionary army, drilled in new
biologically-based war fighting concepts. Because of this enhanced social role the future
soldier will need to be more aware of the consequences of his actions and thus will need
to be more broadly educated.
General John Foss, [Ref. 55] General Commanding TRADOC in 1990, stressed
the flexibility of the commanders and the maintenance of the advantage over the enemy
through the use of technologically advanced systems for the future success of the Army.
He emphasised the command part of C3.
Jacobs [Ref. 56: pp. 22-31] discussed the leadership requirements of the future
battlefield. He looked at the trends that will most influence the future battlefield: the
lethality of current weapon and future weapon systems; the increased battlefield mobility
(this relates to the ability to move forces to an area quickly); and the increased battlefield
fluidity (this relates to the increased capacity to intermix forces and is a derivative of
mobility).
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Jacobs postulated that the future leader will need the following skills:
1. A frame of reference. An understanding of the dynamics of the overall system and
the ability to adjust the system to meet their requirements.
2. More initiative and foresight. Leaders must be more sophisticated and less sensi-
tive to rank implications. They must be able to take charge at key times in the
chaotic battlefield. To do this effectively this sensitivity must diminish.
3. Higher technical competence at all levels.
4. The capacity to generate higher levels of unit cohesion. This is needed because of
the anticipated higher levels of stress.
5. The capacity to operate autonomously. It is likely that, despite advanced com-
munications equipment, communications will be difficult and therefore an under-
standing of the commanders intent is needed to continue to operate autonomously
to successfully complete the mission.
6. Greater flexibility and adaptability.
7. The capacity and the opportunity to experiment with unfamiliar situations and the
capacity to practice again and again so that the initial shock of combat will be
minimised.
8. An awareness of the power and politics.
Jacob predicted that the complexity and uncertainty on the future battlefield
will necessitate higher levels of thinking skills at junior levels and substantially increased
capacity for intelligent, flexible, disciplined, and autonomous action.
3. Manpower
William DePuy [Ref. 57: pp. 122-135] predicts that in the future, given no sig-
nificant structural changes occur, fewer soldiers will be required in the combat areas, and
more in combat support and combat service support functions of the army. He con-
cluded that combat operators jobs will not be much more difficult and sometimes will
be easier in the future. However, the future will be characterized by increased difficulty
with maintenance of complex electronic equipment.
DePuy's paper analyzed how the All-Volunteer Force had done over the first
10 year period and made several conclusions regarding the inability to meet quality and
performance requirements over this period. In his analysis of quality manpower versus
the exploitation of new weapon systems he used a graphical analytical technique to
highlight the importance of human performance. The method assumes that the system
performance, Ps, is the product of the equipment performance, Pe, and human per-
formance, Ph, (i.e., Ps = Pe x Ph). This graph has been reproduced in Figure 4 and
depicts the relationship between the inherent performance of the equipment and the
performance of the operators together with the overall performance of the system, plot-
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The A 11- Volunteer Force After a Decade: Retrospect and
Prospect, p. 131, Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's,
1986.
Figure 4. Graphic Display of System Performance Equation
ted as a series of performance curves. The use of this technique highlights the serious
consequences if actual human performance is below that set for the weapon or support
system performance. Ihe consequences ultimately lead to the statement that the
weapon and support systems may not perform as expected on the battlefield. This point
was made to express the importance of high quality recruits and training.
Binkin [Ref. 58] continues the argument and notes that, given the great magni-
tude of modernization and resources dedicated to Defense in the 1980's, the next gener-
ation of U.S. weaponry will represent a significant improvement in military capability.
However, he questions whether the military can achieve the full potential of this capa-
bility given the complexity of recent equipment purchases and the maintenance problems
they have experienced. He concluded, after an analysis of these systems, that the ability
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to obtain the full capability of future weapon systems rested on the ability of future
personnel to maintain and operate such systems.
Binkin's analysis of recent weapon purchases noted several trends. As systems
became more complexIO the requirements for more skilled personnel to operate and
maintain it increased. In addition there was a kind of ripple effect with increased train-
ing needs, logistic needs and so on. The other point noted was that reliability and
availability of the systems went down as the systems became more complex.l1 These
relationships combined lead to the conclusion that the number of people needed to
maintain a system rises quickly as complexity increases. Binkin analyzed several systems
and noted these trends.
To partially overcome the problem of complexity user friendly systems are being
developed (e.g., M I Abrams tank) to at least lessen the problem for the user. To at-
tempt to increase reliability and availability a method known as black box maintenance
is being employed. With this method components that can be replaced easily are used
in systems and built-in test equipment (BIT) help quicken the maintenance cycle and
allow more on-site maintenance by less qualified technicians to maintain availability.
Binkin noted that the black box concept had not worked as well as expected with the
F-14 and F-15 aircraft, in fact it was called a disaster. Military procurement personnel
hope that the new F-IS will be a better system, as a result of the experiences from the
F-14 and F-15. Binkin concluded that future systems will need more skilled individuals
if the full capabilities of the systems are to be exploited.
Binkin suggested reducing the need for a higher proportion of high quality per-
sonnel by the military decreasing the complexity and increasing the reliability and
availability of future systems.
The services appear to have heeded such advice as a recent RAND studies for
the U.S. Air Force highlighted the need for weapon system reliability and maintainabil-
ity. [Ref. 59] [Ref. 601 But some new systems are still experiencing the same problem as
in the past. The Apache helicopter, recently introduced into the U.S. Army is proving
to be very unreliable for example. [Ref. 611
10 A simple definition of complexity of equipment is the number of components that make
up the total system. The more parts the more complex.
II Reliability is defined as the duration or probability of failure-free performance under stated
conditions. Availability is simply the proportion of time that a system is in commission, or up.
53
4. Technology
The Department of Defense (DOD) has highlighted 20 technologies that it sees
as critical for the future. [Ref 62] They are:
1. Semiconductor materials and microelectronic circuits.
2. Software producibility.
3. Parallel computer architectures.
4. Machine intelligence and robotics.
5. Simulation and modelling.
6. Photonics (fibre optics).
7. Sensitive radars.
8. Passive sensors.
9. Signal processing (automatic target recognition).
10. Signature control (stealth technology),
11. Weapon system environment.
12. Data Fusion.
13. Computational fluid dynamics.
14. Air-breathing propulsion.
15. Pulsed power (this includes high-power microwaves).
16. Hypervelocity projectiles.
17. High energy density materials.
18. Composite materials.
19. Superconductivity.
20. Biotechnology materials and processes.
The list emphasises electronics and computers. DOD believes the maintenance and de-
velopment of these technologies will maintain superiority of U.S. systems.
Several authors have written extensively on the presumption that future weapon
systems will be so advanced that the human role in warfare will decrease significantly.
Shaker and Wise [Ref. 63] predict that there will be robots on the future battlefield and
that they will play an increasingly more powerful role. They see a trend beginning within
the military where professional soldiers are moving away from combat li ,.ies to serve in
front of a computer terminal. Traditional roles, once performed by manned systems, are
being given up to automatic mechanical devices. The technology for substituting for
human-operated systems with robotics is approaching.
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Shaker and Wise define robotic weapon systems as autonomous, semiauton-
omous and teleoperated artificial systems or vehicles that perform military missions
thought to be appropriate for human beings. [Ref. 63: p. 4] They note that the use of
such systems is accepted as advantageous over manned-systems when the following cri-
teria [Ref 63: p. 1611 are met:
1. When the lethality of the mission is too great or when cultural norms prohibit us
from committing soldiers to suicidal missions. Robotic vehicles may survive ex-
tremely toxic or explosive environments and, if destroyed, only an expensive piece
of equipment needs to be replaced.
2. When human resources need to be diverted to other priorities. Robotic systems
can free essential manpower to preform higher priority missions by taking on less
complex, redundant missions.
3. When the overall efficiency and effectiveness of a task can be better accomplished
through automation.
Today's robotic systems are either remote-controlled systems or programmable
systems. However, the simple remote-controlled systems are giving way to the pro-
grammable systems that are capable of taking action in response to situations antic-
ipated by their programmers. Shaker and Wise believe the opportunity for weapon
superiority afforded by these systems in conjunction with the increasing danger in the
battlefield may relegate man to the benches leaving machines to fight the war. If this
trend continues, it will not be a question of if it will happen, but how long will it take.
They note that it would be unwise to put robots into the more complex roles
immediately. There are more immediate and important missions for robots to perform
within the logistics environment. The movement of supplies on autonomous robotic
vehicles and the load and unload functions are within the capabilities of robotics today.
The basics for these applications are known now and can be developed and modified to
meet these needs. Such systems will free manpower for other tasks. Shaker and Wise
believe the first completely autonomous robot that will utilize its own artificial intelli-
gence may not appear until 2005.
The eventual applications for robotics that are being researched include: re-
motely piloted vehicles (RPV) for surveillance tasks; robotic submarines for mine war-
fare; robotic land vehicles for surveillance and explosive ordinance disposal (EOD);
actual weapon systems (e.g., cruise missile and robotic tank); and many others.
Barnaby [Ref. 64] goes one step further and automates the entire battlefield.
ie believes the advances in military technology that are making the automated battle-
field possible are developments in surveillance, guidance systems for weapons, and in
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warhead design. Barnaby predicts that by 2010 the fully automated battlefield will be
possible, given current trends in developments.
fie summarizes changes in warfare into three subject areas: lethality of con-
ventional weapons, surveillance and target acquisition, and command, control and
communications (C3). Firstly, because of the increased lethality of weapons, people will
be killed at far greater rates than previous conflicts. The wounded will be injured more
severely. Given the increased numbers of casualties, medical resources will be quickly
exhausted. Psychological stress may account for more casualties than physical weapons.
This is because the modern battlefield will operate 24 hours a day with little or no rest
for the troops. The soldier will be constantly under fire from weapons of tremendous
firepower. They will wear cumbersome and hot protective suits to protect them from
possible attack from chemical weapons. The effects of mcdern weapons will extend over
larger areas. People far from the fighting will be under threat of attack from modern
weapons.
Barnaby questions that troops will continue to put themselves at risk given this
environment. -Ie contends that as standards of living increase and people are more at-
tuned to the comforts of life their willingness to go into such an environment will de-
crease. Thus the increased lethality is focusing attention on automated warfare.
The second factor Barnaby noted was the improvements in surveillance and
target acquisition The ability to detect the enemy and then guide weapon systems to
the target is available today in many systems, The vast information that the surveillance
systems produce is far too much for a human brain, according to Barnaby, to analyze
quickly enough. Therefore, it is critical for the data to be analyzed by a computer to
separate the useful from the useless information. He believes that as computers develop
the skill to make decisions, through artificial intelligence, then it must be expected that
the military will make the most out of this capability. Thus, the computerized C3 func-
tion along with autonomous weapons is the heart of the automated batdefield.
Bamaby concludes that the increased destructive potential of modem weapons
is making the soldier less willing to fight and that armies cannot afford to lose large
numbers of personnel. Modem weapons are more complicated and require highly-skilled
operators, who cost more to train and a;e difficult to replace. In addition, the future
battlefield will be more stressful. Therefore, an interest has been established in the future
employment of unmanned vehicles and the use of robots on the battlefield by many
modem countries. Bamaby believes this interest along with technological availability is
enough to lead to the evolution of the automated battlefield.
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5. Military Medicine
Medical personnel represent approximately 10 percent of the active-duty and
reserve force and thus represent a sizable proportion part of the U.S. military. There-
fore, the proper number and composition of medical personnel is essential to support the
accomplishment of the military mission. Smith [Ref. 65] noted that combat casualty care
was just as important to the military mission as either fire support or logistics. He be-
lieved that combat casualty care can determine the success or failure of any military
mission. He concluded that the military's medical system for combat casualty support
had two fundamental elements: (1) Patient management systems and facilities; and (2)
Sources of trained contingency manpower.
The official goals of military medicine are based on Defense Guidance. The
Defense Guidance for Fiscal 1992-1997 specifies:
Meeting medical readiness requirements is the highest priority of the Military Health
Services System [MHSS. Readiness requirements are the primary criterion for de-
termining the size and composition of the peacetime active duty force and the facil-
ities of the direct care system. lowever, the numbers and kinds of medical
personnel required in the total and on active duty are determined by a combination
of the wartime requirements, the manpower that can deliver cost-effective health
care through the direct health care system in peacetime, and the requiremeiit for
medical personnel outside the direct care system in peacetime. We will continue to
increase the capability of the medical Services to perform wartime missions. [Ref.
66]
Medical care in any future war will be influenced by the then current standards
of care. The past has provided guidance that medical standards of care will preclude
most surgery in the war zone, except for the immediate repair of arterial trauma. It has
been noted that casualties can be stabilize2 with airway control and treated for shock
with plasma expanders and shipped hundreds of miles away. Such a policy was imple-
mented by the Israelis for the treatment of abdominal wounds in their 1973 and 1982
wars. The mortality for the delay group, who were shipped 60 to 200 miles, was five
percent in comparison to the entire group which had a mortality of 7.9 percent. "Surgery
on 141 of the 178 abdominal casualties was delayed from 8 to 17 hours from the time
of their injury. They were well supported hemodynamically along the chain of evacu-
ation and none died en route." [Ref. 67] Thus, the mortality and morbidity rate was less
with the transported casualties than with those who had surgical intervention in the war
zone. In any future war it is conceivable that casualties will be treated outside the war
zone.
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Previous authors [Ref. 37] [Ref. 38] have noted the increased specialization that
technology causes within medicine. This necessity for increased specialization pervades
all of medicine. The military trains enlisted personnel in the procedures which are speci-
fied by the staffing standards of their Service. In the U.S. Navy, a hospital corpsman
requires two years to become 87 percent productive. [Ref. 68] However, less than 60
percent of corpsmen remain at a duty station after two years and fewer than five percent
remain after three years. [Ref. 69] Therefore, the productivity levels of the military fa-
cility must be low because a majority of personnel on staff are not in the one place long
enough to work at their maximum productivity levels. This must signal a problem for
maintaining trained personnel in military facilities.
6. Defense Industry
Tirman [Ref 70] noted that after Ronald Reagan gained office in 1981 a policy
of high military budgets was pursued by the White House. The emphasis was on the
procurement of advanced military products. These products were technologies, often
very sophisticated, to be used in weapons, communications, transportatiun, and other
applications. The growing emphasis on high technology by the military is unsettling
conomists and technologists, as high technulogy is regarded as being one of the U.S.
strong points in world trade. Tirman viewed the military's drive for scientists and facil-
ities to support military research as direct competition with civilian,,commercial appli-
cations. Firms that may be developing an applicat'on for the military may not be
developing the commercial application. Tirman notes that this situation is being
criticised. There is a danger for the U.S. that other countries will develop commercial
applications preempt the U.S. position in world trade. There is also a danger for the firm
in that the military may terminate a contract and it will be left without the skilled man-
power and capital to compete in the commercial market.
In his conclusion, Tirman [Ref. 70: pp. 215-2351 surm,,arized the effects of the
policy of increased R&D and procurement of military related systems pursued by the
Reagan administration:
1. DOD affects the choices and conduct of research in the universities, industry, and
national laboratories. This is because DOD employs about one third of the scien-
tific and technical workforce and the funding of R&D is more dependan, on mili-
tary sources than any other. This influence skews research being conducted
towards areas that have a military application and away from a more broad based
R&D program.
2. DOD limits or distorts the traditional prerogatives of Science. Commercial high
technology ;- Iustries are reliant on technical innovation and new knowledge for
growth. in lie military the scientists work is altered in two ways. Firstly the mil-
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itary insists on secrecy. The normal channels (conferences and published work) are
closed to the military scientist, thus constricting the perspective of the scientist.
This leads to the second effect is the narrowness of the field in which the scientists
works. This creates a highly specialized individual whose only use is only suitable
for military -related specialized work.
3. DOD often directs the course of technological development. DOD can dominate
an entire industry and the technology it uses.
4. DOD adversely affects the small, innovative firms in high technology. Many in-
novations are derived from small firms. The problem is they cannot compete for
the bigger salaries. Therefore when the large DOD contract are offered thz scien-
tists from the little firms are scooped up by the bigger firms for work on DOD
projects.
5. DOD specifications for high technology products may create over-development.
The specification requirement's for their equipment requires far more precision
than civilian specifications. This results in large amounts of time spent in devel-
oping these systems.
6. Defense has enormous effects on economic conditions generally--which affect
growth industries--yet has no corresponding industrial policy to compensate for
such effects. There are several components to this view: (a) DOD spending, be-
cause it is not productive, stimulates inflation by pumping wages into the economy
without creating products; (b) )O) spending creates unemployment because 't is
capital intensive; (c) The political nature of I)OD spending has lead to shift of in-
vestment from the northeast and midwest to the south and southwest; and (d) the
sheer size of DOD budgets have sapped the U.S. economic vitality.
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III. SYNTHESIS AND POSSIBLE IMPACTS
The first section of this chapter is a short summary of the main points raised by the
authors reviewed in Chapter II. The next section synthesises these points into the main
driving directions that te :hnological change is moving society, the organization of work,
and the riflitary. The linal section of Chapter III discusses the implications of these
directions for the military.
A. SUMMARY OF LITERATURE
1. General Theories
This section discussed several authors and their general views regarding the fu-
ture. The authors reviewed were separated into two sub-groups: futurist studies dis-
cussed those authors impressions of what the future will be like, how society will be
structured, and what work patterns will be; and the issue writers discussed the authors
impressions of the impacts of technological change on work and made several pred-
ictions regarding the impacts of technological change and recommend possible solutions
to the potential problems that technological change will bring.
a. Futurist Studies
Alvin Toffler (Ref. If [Ref. 8: pp. 59-711 is among the most widely known
futurists. Ile predicted that the future society--the Third Wave Society--would be radi.
cally different from today's society. He and another prominent futurist, Naisbitt, [Ref,
12] [Ref. 13] have predicted that the future will be dominated by information. Both au-
thors envision work as radically different. There will be fewer workers in the factories.
Products will be customized. Compensation packages for employees will be tailored for
their wishes. Firms will be decentralized, smaller in size, flater in organizational struc-
ture and located more frequently in non-urban areas (Naisbitt called it the electronic
heartland). The most significant factor regarding future work, according to Toffler will
be the shift back to home-based work. Naisbitt goes on to suggest that the well-
educated, information trained worker would demand the best wages. He sees the un-
skilled, uneducated worker as the most threatened. Because of the high percentage of
women who went into information related jobs in the 1980's, as they rise through the
ranks, more an more women will be placed in leadership positions. Naisbitt also predicts
that the globalization of the world economy and lifestyles will continue because of the
economics and the capabilities of communications. Naisbitt sees in biotechnology great
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potential to solve many world problems. But it also has great potential for disaster.
Biotechnology presents many moral and social dilemmas and will challenge society.
Oier futurist writers warn that not enough is known of the impacts of
modern technology. Henderson [Ref. 15] and Florman [Ref. 8: pp. 122-132] in particular
stress that a more realistic approach is needed in predicting the consequences of tech-
nological change. Schnaars [Ref. 16] warns against overly optimistic forecasts and
Rochell and Spellman [Ref 14] challenge the predictions of Toffler and Naisbitt, noting
that what is technologically possible is not always what is politically, economically, or
institutionally possible. Society is not prepared for the changes that technology offers
and the consequences could be disastrous. For work, Rochell and Spellman, see a de-
clining middle class and the polarization of society as the computer takes control and
workers lose control and an understanding of their work. They are particularly wary of
the effects for migrant and minority workers who are most threatened by the computer
as automation is taking over more and more routine jobs.
b. Issue tVriters
The issue writers concentrate on both specific and general effects of tech-
nological change. Leontief and Duchin [Ref. 17] project that the overall demand for la-
bor in 2000, given rapid technological change which is quickly adopted, will be
significantly less from the scenario where technological change did not occur at all.
Thus, it was concluded that there are significant labor gains as a result of technological
change. Thc occupational structure will change by 2000, with more professional occu-
pations and less clerical occupations in the total labor force. They note that there will
also be a decline in the number of managers. Most significantly, there will not be a de-
cline in the number of semi-skilled or unskilled jobs.
Hirschhorn [Ref. 18] and Shaiken [Ref. 19] both emphasise that the worker
is an important part of the production process. Both consider it necessary to improve
the job for the worker once a new technology is implemented. Shaiken in particular is
concerned that management had taken control of technological change within organ-
izations and is threatening the role of the worker.
The Panel on Technology and Employment has made several observations
and predictions about technological change and its impacts on employment. Their main
observation is that technological change must continue if production and wage growth
are to continue. Secondly, they believe that technological change has been associated
with job growth and that this trend will continue. Therefore, high rates of unemploy-
ment will not occur. They see the pace of technological change to be gradual and not
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rapid. Finally, they note that to avoid large scale job displacements, productivity in-
creasing technologies should be adopted quickly.
The panel's conclusions regarding technological changes and its effects on
the worker are that the level of job-related skills would not change as a result of tech-
nology and that employment opportunities will not be limited for individuals with strong
basic skills. The panel did note that those workers who are displaced and experienced the
longest delays in finding reemployment are workers who lack basic skills. These workers
also experienced significant losses in reemployment earnings.
Finally, the panel recommends that employers need to give notice of their
intent to lay-off workers and that the adoption of new work-based technologies be ac-
companied by employment policies that strengthen workplace security, i.e., worker re-
training schemes and reliance on attrition rather than retrenchment.
2. Discipline-Specific Approaches
The theory section raised many issues across a wide variety of topical areas that
included economic, psychological, sociological, and organizational implications.
a. Economic Theory
Economic theory offers several hypotheses. The neo-classical theory of
production relates the quantities of inputs (capital and labor) to quantity of outputs.
With a change in technology there is an increase in output with a subsequent change in
the levels of inputs. These changes in the levels of inputs lead to the classification of
technological change in one of three ways; neutral, labor-saving, and capital-saving. It
was noted that this theory focuses on cost-reducing improvements and not improve-
ments in the product.
Several hypotheses were discussed regarding the measurement of and influ-
ences on the rate of technological change. The various possible measures of technolog-
ical change were changes in labor productivity, productivity indices, and residual
analyses. The factors that were said to influence the rate of technological change in-
cluded: the level of resources devoted to R&D; demand for new products; supply factors
such as increased factor prices or input shortages; and the market structure (i.e., non-
competitive versus competitive).
The final economic theory discussed related to structural changes in the
long-run where it was postulated [Ref. 26] [Ref. 10: pp. 153-171.] [Ref. 27] that there
existed long-wave cycles that were initiated by major technological innovations that had
a periodicity of 40-50 years. These waves had four phases that began with a bang and
ended in depression until the next change comes along to start it all again. This theory
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is disputed by some authors [Ref. 281 [Ref 29] who claim that there is not enough sta-
tistical evidence to substantiate the theory and that the fluctuations that were said to
be long waves in the original data, used to develop the theory, can be explained by
higher rates of inflation caused by major wars and not technological change.
b. Psychological Theory
The discussion of psychological theory noted that technology was not a
prime cause of worker behavior but just one of many influencing forces. The actual
emphasis for the study of individual behavior is on change itself and not technology.
Individuals can react in one of three ways to a change in the work environment: ac-
ceptance, toleration, and resistance. The response depends on the perception of the
worker as to the benefits or the contrary that the change will bring. It will also depend
on the way the change is introduced; a function that is controlled by management.
c. Sociological Theory
Discussiox, of sociological theory revealed that society can be partitioned
into many parts differentiated by groups, social class, race, ethnicity, sex, and insti-
tutions. Each of these components will include people who are part of other compo-
nents. Social change was defined as significant changes in social relationships and
cultural ideas and it was noted that technological change is one of the causal factors of
social change. Social change is introduced into society through the processes of invention
and innovation. The literature noted that different parts of society will change at various
rates. This was referred to as the cultural lag.
d. Organizational Theory
Organizational theory was divided into two parts; structure and labor.
Within the structure section it was noted that the requirement for technology develop-
ment was one of the factors that affected how a firm would structure itself to implement
a given strategy. 1." technology changes then this will cause changes to various parts of
an organization in order to adjust for optimum performance within a market. Changes
in both product and process technologies have caused firms to invest heavily in R&D
to maintain a competitive advantage. The amount spent on R&D has increased to take
advantage of the economies of scale that technology offers and the emphasis has shifted
to centrally directed and controlled R&D.
The technologies that will have the largest effect on organizational structure
in the future will be information processing, communications, and production technolo-
gies. Future strategies will need to exploit these technologies to gain competitive ad-
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vantage. It was hypothesized that in the future organizations will downsize and
decentralize to maintain a competitive advantage.
Organizational theory regarding labor focuses on the probable effects on
skill levels, worker displacement, and unemployment. Opposing opinions were discussed
regarding the effects of technological change on these problems. It was postulated that
technological change will: enhance skill levels or it will degrade skill-levels; create un-
employment or create jobs; and displace sections of the labor force. In addition other
concerns were: the possible polarization of the work force; centralized power structures
and declining middle management; and automation of the office environment and the
negative effects for women.
3. Civilian-Sector Forecasts
This section discussed civilian sector literature. The literature was presented
under two broad headings: labor force projections and industry projections. Selected
industries were reviewed within the industry projections section.
a. Labor Force Projections
Kutscher [Ref. 37] has made several projections for 2000. Labor force
growth for the period 1986-2000 was projected at 21 nillion--1.3 percent per annum. The
majority of this growth--over 90 percent--will be either minorities or women. The
younger age bracket--16 to 24 year-olds--will continue to decline.
Projections for the economy included a 40 percent increase in GNP--2.4
percent per annum. This is a slowing of economic growth when compared to the pre-
vious period. This growth- is greater than that for the labor force and can be attributed
to productivity. Productivity growth was attributed to several factors, one of which was
an increase il the capital-labor ratio.
The projection for employment growth for this period was 21 million new
jobs. The service-producing sector will account for nearly all of this job growth. Within
the service-producing sector, job growth in health-related service industries will be the
largest contributor. Employment within manufacturing will continue to decline.
Personick [Ref. 38] noted that masked by this decline in manufacturing employment was
an occupational shift to higher skill-levels. Personick indicated that the growth in
health-related industries was fuelled by technological innovations.
Kutscher [Ref. 37] noted, along with Silvestri and Lukasiewicz, [Ref. 39] that
the share of occupations that required a minimum of one year of college education was
increasing; the share of jobs that required high school level education was slightly de-
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clining; and the share of those jobs that require less than a high school level education
was declining rapidly.
Mark [Ref. 40] presented several conclusions of Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) research regarding technological change. They included: the rate of technological
change is increasing; and only a few employee's are actually laid off because of techno-
logical change. Mark agreed with the Kutscher, Silvestri, and Lukasiewicz that the oc-
cupational structure is changing. Mark noted that certain measures can be taken to
facilitate technological change, including: advance notice for workers, coordination of
the labor adjustment, and employee retraining.
b. Industry Projections
(1) Manufacturing. The manufacturing industry is experiencing a de-
cline in the total numbers of employees but the necessary skill level is rising due to the
increased complexity of the systems. It was noted by both Wall and Kemp [Ref. 10: pp.
1-14] and Burnes and Fitter [Ref. 10: pp. 83-99] that the introduction of new technology
will either cause greater centralization of control or the decentralization and delegation
of authority to the lowest level. Wall and Fitter concluded from empirical evidence from
studies on individual manufacturing firms, that the first option occurred more frequently
than the latter. This has resulted in the deskilling of the operators and the control of the
process is now in the hands of only a few specialists. They question though the quality
of working life that nov exists for the operators.
Cummings and Blumberg [Ref. 10: pp. 37-60] and Clegg and Corbett
[Ref. 10: pp. 173-195] agree that the structure adopted by a firm will need to change to
capitalize on the benefits the new technologies offer. Clegg and Corbett also note that
as the complexity of the new systems increases there is a need for employees with
stronger problem-solving skills. This point is also made by Burnes and Fitter who see
that supervisor's traditional roles as man-managers are changing to more of a system
manager where the solution to system problems is of prime importance. Bessant and
Senker [Ref. 10: pp. 153-171] also point out that because of the increased heavy reliance
on advanced manufacturing technology, the reliance on the maintenance personnel is
increasing to ensure the continued operation of the systems.
(2) Microelectronics. Central to microelectronics is the silicon chip tha.
can be used as either the central processing unit or memory or a computer. The revo-
lution that has surrounded the microelectronics industry is related to the significant in-
creases in capacity and the reductions in production costs that the silicon chip has
brought about. The impact that the microelectronics has had on society is significant.
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The silicon chip has a wide variety of applications and is found in an enormous range
of products. The most significant impact it has had is on work.
Francis [Ref. 411 noted that four debates have surfaced regarding the
effects of microelectronics on work. Firstly, that it will create unemployment, due to its
labor-saving abilities. Secondly, there is a concern for the effects on skill levels (i.e., will
it enhance or degrade skill levels?). The third debate centers around the structures that
will be adopted to take advantage of the technology. Finally, the possibility of a shift to
the short-term by employees and employers (i.e., the skill is specific to the occupation
and not the firm).
Francis reached several conclusions regarding each of the debates.
Firstly, he did not envisage massive unemployment as a result of technological change.
Secondly, he saw that jobs, in the main, would not be de-skilled. He saw that deskilling
was counter productive and that management would enhance employment to attract and
keep better employees. The final two debates he considered very complex however he
concluded that organizations will become smaller and increase the use of sub-
contractors.
(3) Information Technology. Information technology will primarily af-
fect the white-collar worker. Kraut [Ref. 441 noted that women will be affected more
than men as they have the larger share of information jobs. He believed that informa-
tion technology has the potential to alter managerial, professional and clerical work.
BLS projections confirmed that the number of clerical jobs was declining. Kraut also
presented arguments that the level of structural unemployment was on the rise as a re-
sult of the significant labor savings information technology offers to employers.
Chamot [Ref. 44: pp. 23-33] was concerned that the introduction of
information technology into the office had the potential to deskill and increase stress
levels in employees. Increased stress levels were attributed to poor ergonomics, and in-
creased monitoring of work by computers and exploitation of employee who choose to
work from home using telecommunications equipment.
(4) Medical Technology. It was highlighted that medical technology is
increasing at a rapid pace and that the growth in health related jobs was also increasing.
It was also stressed that medical technologies were very expensive.
An unusual point regarding medical technology is that when it is in-
troduced it does not usually replace an older existing technology but is added to the
older technology as another procedure,'test available for the doctor to ubc or the patient
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to demand. Therefore instead of technology substituting for labor it is placing a demand
for more specialized labor.
4. Military Forecasts
The military authors reviewed were broken down into several subject areas:
policy, the future battlefield, manpower, technology, and defense industry. They offered
several interesting points to consider.
a. Policy
Technology plays a central role in U.S. defense policy. The U.S. uses tech-
nological advantage in its military systems to maintain a competitive advantage over the
numerically superior Soviets. [Ref. 47] The implications are high R&D budgets and an
emphasis on quality manpower to operate and maintain the high technology equipment.
The advances that the U.S. has made in recent years have the potential to change radi-
cally the nature of war. The military has enacted policy in an attempt to ensure that the
manpower requirements are thought of early in the deveiopment and procurement cycle.
The policy employed by the U.S. Army is known as MANPRINT. [Ref. 48]
b. The Future Battlefield
The U.S. Army has established an organization within TRADOC to develop
a future war fighting concept for the time period 2000-2025. The concept is known as
ARMY 21. [Ref. 50] To develop the concept several assumptions were made, including
the assumption that new technologies will continue to influer.ce military thinking. From
these assumptions, implications were gained and allowed a concept to be developed of
the requirements and characteristics of the future battlefield. This concept included:
prepared to fight anywhere in the world; weapon parity is dependant on technology; a
need to avoid decisive action; the first battle will be critical; and a need for strategic
mobility.
The future battlefield's characteristics included: expanded in all directions;
very lethal; C31 is emphasised since communications will be very difficult and that there
will be an abundance of real time information. The future Army's characteristics in-
cluded: mobility; agility; firepower; offensive spirit; self-sufficiency; continuous oper-
ations; and less manpower-reliant. The future soldier's characteristics included: initiative;
wide variety of skills; and capable of independent action.
Several senior military commanders [Ref. 51] [Ref. 521 [Ref. 55] agree with
this concept of the future battlefield and in particular stress the central role that will be
played by the soldier. They also stressed the importance of training and C31. Another
author [Ref. 54] also emphasises the central role of the soldier but went one step further
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and hinted that technology can enhance individual skills and prepare the individual for
combat through biotechnological techniques.
Leadership on the battlefield in the future could also be different. [Ref. 56:
pp. 22-31] The future leader will need certain skills that include: an understanding of the
entire system; initiative and foresight; technical competence; capacity to generate higher
levels of unit cohesion; capacity to operate autonomously; flexibility and adaptability;
capacity to experiment with unfamiliar situations; and an awareness of power and poli-
tics. It was noted that the future leader will need a higher level of thinking skills to un-
derstand the complexity and uncertainty of the future battlefield.
c. Manpower
Several issues were addressed regarding manpower and technology by two
authors, Depuy [Ref. 57] and Binkin. [Ref. 58] Depuy noted that in the future fewer
soldiers will be required in the combat area but more will be required in the support
areas. He saw a problem in the future with maintenance of complex electronic equip-
ment. His analysis noted that if human performance was not as it should be then the
system performance on the battlefield will suffer. Binkin went on to cite several exam-
ples where the complexity of the equipment had led to reliability and availability prob-
lems. He concluded that if the military wanted to get the best performance from its new
systems then it will need high quality manpower. Binkin noted if the military wanted to
lower the quality of manpower then it needed to decrease the complexity of ty-e equip-
ment it was developing.
d. Technology
Technology itself has taken center stage with 20 technologies highlighted
each year for special attention by DOD R&D specialists. [Ref, 62] The 1990 list
emphasises electronics and computers. Some authors, Shaker and Wise, [Ref. 631 have
written specifically about robotics and its uses on the battlefield. They saw that robots
will play an increasingly more central role in the future with humans paling into the
background. They noted specifically that robotic systems can be for missions when the
environment is too dangerous for a human (e.g., chemical, nuclear). They highlighted
the efficiencies of robots and suggested the first area where robots could make their mark
would be in logistic support functions. Shaker and Wise predicted that the first fully
autonomous robot will not appear until 2005.
Barnaby [Ref. 64] believes that technology is capable of automating the
entire battlefield with man playing a supporting role far from the battlefield. He saw
technology dominating in three areas that make the concept of the automated battlefield
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a possibility. The areas are: increased lethality of weapons; surveillance and target ac-
quisition systems; and C3 systems. Central to the idea is the increased lethality of the
battlefield and the increased standards of living experienced in modern societies. The
combination of the two create's a society that is not willing to risk it on the battlefield.
Therefore the alternative is to increase the use of machines to fight the battle. Barnaby
predicted that the fully automated battlefield was not possible until about 2010.
e. Military Medicine
Military medical personnel account for 10 percent of the military's man-
power. Smith [Ref. 65] believes that combat casualty care is just as important to a
combat mission's success as logistic support and conciuded there are two elements that
are fundamental to the military's combat casualty system: (1) Patient management sys-
tems, and (2) Sources of trained contingency manpower.
Official goals for military medicine are outlined by Defense Guidance. [Ref.
66] For Fiscal 1992-1997, Defense Guidance emphasises medical readiness requirements
as the number one priority for the Military Health Services System (MIJSS). In addi-
tion, the readiness requirements are also the primary criterion for determining the size
and composition of the peacetime active duty force and facilities of the direct-care sys-
tem.
Standards of care in future wars will be influenced by the then current
standards. Recent military orerations provide evidence that future wars will preclude
most surgery in the war zone with most casualties being treated outside the war zone.
[Ref. 67] The final point noted within this section is that technological change has in-
creased specialization within medicine. This trend is evident within the military where
most trained medical personnel spend the majority of some tours in military medical fa-
cilities learning to operate specialized equipment. Studies show that some U.S. Navy
corpsmen take two years to become 87 percent productive in plocedures that are speci-
fied by the staffing standards for the Navy and that fewer than five percent remain more
than three years at one duty station. [Ref. 68] [Ref. 69] This signals a problem for the
U.S. Navy in maintaining trained personnel in one location.
f. Defense Industry
The final section regarding the military literature reviewed dealt with the
defense industry. Tirman [Ref. 70] noted that there is a group of economists and
technologists that believe the emphasis placed on R&D by DOD is detrimental for the
U.S economy. Tirman noted several effects: DOD influences what is researched; DOD
limits the abilities of individual scientists; DOD directs the course of a development; and
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DOD specifications for products may over-develop a product. Tirman saw that the
emphasis on military research was stifling possible civilian applications and products.
In some cases products were developed off-shore and any benefits to the U.S. were lost.
Tirman presented several arguments that suggested DOD was having enormous effect
on economic conditions in general.
B. SYNTHESIS
The literature reviewed has covered many areas regarding the effects of technological
change. The literature in places has been in agreement and in others there are broad
contrasts. This section brings the literature together and establishes the directions that
technological change may take society, work, and the military.
1. Society
It is apparent from the literature reviewed that there are six major concerns re-
garding the social effects of technological change and the future. They are: the rate of
technological change, the broad effects, the positive and negative sides of technological
change, the overly optimistic forecasts, the possible social effects of information and
medical technology.
a. Rate of Technological Change
The first concern is with the rate at which technological change is occurring.
It is evident that the rate of technological charge is increasing. [Ref. 15] [Ref. 8: pp.
122-132] [Ref. 40] This increasing rate creates problems for society as it attempts to
adapt as there is not enough time for a comprehensive assessment of the consequences,
both good and bad, that technological change will bring. Sociological theory notes that
the rate of change is related to the pace at which the diffusion process occurs. The faster
the diffusion of the new technology within society the more rapid the rate of technolog-
ical change. Sociological theory also suggests the rate of technological change will be
faster in some parts of society than others, depending on the rigidity of the social struc-
ture. [Ref. 331 It can be expected that if the rate of technological change is accelerating
then conflicts will arise between different parts within the society, as some parts adapt
quickly and others resist the changes.
In contrast to this the Panel on Technology and Employment [Ref. 21] saw
that the adoption of new technologies was generally gradual rather than sudden. The
conclusion was made with regard to work but the intent can be extrapolated to society.
This slower diffusion of technological change allows time for the effects to become ap-
parent and the introduction of policies to help the affected parties. This later comment
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confirms the point that the rate of technological change is critical. The faster the rate
of technological change the more critical is the need to understand the effects of the
change.
Economic theory suggests the rate of technological change is directly related
to the amount spent on R&D. The literature notes some interesting facts. First, the
military has increased its budget in R&D since the early 1980's. [Ref. 70] Organizational
theory notes that the emphasis for competition in the 1980's has shifted to product and
process innovations and thus R&D budgets have increased. [Ref. 34: pp. 29-411 Finally,
the total body of medical technology knowledge is doubling every three and a half years.
[Ref. 45] These facts combined with economic theory could lead to the conclusion that
the rate of technological change must be increasing and not running at a constant level.
The medical factors suggest the rate could be quite fast.
If the long wave theories, discussed in the economic theory section, are ac-
cepted and that major technological innovations occur with a 40-50 periodicity. This
implies that the pace of technological change is constant. However, if the amount of
money for R&D is increasing then the periodicity of major innovations may decrease.
If this occurs and the cycles of the long-wave that describe the patterns associated with
these innovations hold, then society will most likely go through rapid change.
b. The Broad Effects
The second general concern is that the effects of tect'nological change are
so broad that they will invade all aspects of society to the point of changing people's
values and thus changing society.
Sociological theory suggests that the varic,; components of society form
varies taxonomies and that each of these components have differing norms, status and
roles, and culiure that will cause society to react differently to technology changes.
Among the 10 trends noted by Naisbitt as changing the world were the shift to the global
lifestyles; the decade of women in leadership; and the age of biology. [Ref. 13] Each of
these trends challenges the differ-nt components of a society to change their roles, cul-
ture and norms. The age of biology will pose questions of society that affects its
origins--the creation of life. How does society challenge this science? What directions
and limitations will society give it? Th,- answers can only be found if a society educates
itself as to the issue at stake and understands the possible consequences of its decision.
[Ref. 32]
Another example of the broad effects of technological change on society
that was raised in the literature is the possible polarization of the workforce. [Ref. 14]
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If this is an eventual outcome from technological change then the consequences for so-
ciety are enormous. The possible social instability that a two-class society experiences
is well documented in history.
c. The Two Sides of Technological Change
The broad issues that are aiffected by technological change lead to the third
concern. Technological change will always have both positive and negative effects. [Ref.
8: pp. 72-941 [Ref. 8: pp. 122-132.] These effects will not always be readily apparent. The
invention of the elevator led to the construction of taller buildings and allowed society
to move into apartmer, buildings in urban areas. This fact in turn led to changes in the
family because of the difficulty in raising a family in this environmen: and ultimately the
urban birth rate declined. [Ref. 33] Therefore, if there will be both positive and negative
effects, society will need to question and study technological change to ensure the con-
sequences are fully understood. This is already occurring with studies such as those of
the potential effects of technological change on employment. [Ref. 11] [Rif. 211 [Ref.
22] In addition, as with the previously mentioned concern regarding the broad effects,
society should be aware of the ultimate consequences technological change can bring.
d. Optimistic Forecasts
The fourth general broad concern regarding technological change is the
overly optimistic forecast. Schnaars [Ref. 16] and Rochell and Spellman [Ref. 14] were
very critical of the tendency of forecasters to push the best scenario without consideling
other influencing factors. Rochell and Spellman attack the very positive predictions of
Toffler [Ref. 1] [Ref. 8: pp. 59-71] and Naisbitt [Ref. 12] noting that the their (ToMer and
Naisbitt) forecasts may have been technologically possible but quesioned whether the,
were economically, politically or institutionally feasible. This comes back to the point,
raised in the background section to this thesis, that there are seven broad factors that
operate in a society: demographic changes, technological innovation, -ocial innovation,
cultural-value shifts, information-idea shifts, and cultural diffusion. IRef. 9] Technology
will not change society alone but is one of several forces directing society. Therefore,
future forecasts will need to be more realistic about probable changes and effects that
technology will bring, taking into account the other factors that affect a society.
e. Injormation and Medical Technology
The pervasive effects of changes in both information and medical technol-
ogy are a concern for society. All authors agree [Ref. 8: pp. 59-71] [Ref. 12] that the
future will be dominated by the abundance of information. The whole world will literally
be available to each individual through televihion and other media. The availability of
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information is causing the world society to become one. This cffect may initiate new at-
tempts to maintain some cultural identity by the different components within society.
[Ref. 131
The pace of technological change is particularly fast within medicine. The
employment growth in health related occupations will be among the fastest for the next
decade. The trends within medicine are such that as innovations are adapted they in-
crease the total level of employment because they do not replace older procedures or
tests but instead enhance them. One result is that the costs of health care are increasing
rapid]y.
f. Summary
The rate of technological change is increasing. This will have significant ef-
fects on society if the consequences of decisions made regarding the employment of
technology are not considered. Also, because technological change is accepted at differ-
ent rates within a society, the rapid rate of change will cause conflicts between different
parts of society. The range of the components of society that will be affected will be
broad. The effects of technological change are both positive and negative. It is neces-
sary to understand all ol the implications of a change before it is implemented. Be wary
of the overly optimistic fbrecast. A more realistic approach is needed if the true effects
are to be predicted. Information will dominate the future. The availability of informa-
tion will en ible society to be bet er informed and take a more active role in the decisions
to be made. The pace of medical technology is creating more employment at a greater
cost.
2. Wo.'rk
This section on the synthesis of the literature as it relates to work is divided into
two parts; structure and skills. Structure focuses on the macro-level down to the firm
and Skills focuses on the individual.
a. Structure
(1) Occupational Structure. The literature on the occupational structure
of the economy to 2000 is in agreement. The future occupational structure will see the
proportion of occupations requiring a college level education increase. The proportion
of occupations that require a high school eduction will remain the sam,: and the pro-
portion of jobs tha.t require less than high bchrol education will decline. (Ref. 171 [Ref.
371 [Ref. 391
Within these broad guidelines for the occupational structure there are
four inter-sting occurrences. First, the number of clerical jobs, an occupation that is
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traditionally held by women, is decreasing. [Ref. 44] [Ref. 171 Second, it is predicted that
the requirement for the number of middle-management positions is decreasing. [Ref.
171 [Ref. 14] Third, the occupational structure is continuing to shift from blue-collar to
white-collar work. Finally, it is likely that a large proportion of middle-class Americans
will shift out of the urban areas and into the non-urban areas of the U.S. [Ref. 13]
(2) Effects from the Changes. These projections for an overall better
qualified workforce and the four occurrences listed above, when combined with the fact
that the bulk (over 90 percent) of labor force growth will be either women or minorities
offer some interesting results. Firstly, minorities, on average, have the lowest educa-
tional qualifications and this could lead to a mismatch of skills, i.e., low-skilled potential
employees looking for jobs offered by employers who are looking for high-skilled em-
ployees. Second, if the number of traditional jobs held by women is decreasing then
women will begin to enter jobs that they have not previously occupied. This could lead
to new work practices, rules, and potential for conflict within these occupations. Third,
the shift to a higher proportion of high-skilled jobs within both the blue-collar and
white-collar occupations may exacerbate the problem of labor displacement. [Ref. 21]
Finally, if the number of middle management positions declines, there is an increase in
the number of lower skilled employees in the labor market, and the number of upper-
level management positions increases then a polarization of the workforce could develop
and lead to distinct social prcolems.
There has been a conceria that technological change will lead to
massive unemployment due to jobs being replaced by machines. [Ref. 14] This is un-
likely to occur in the foreseeable future as productivity growth will create more jobs than
are lost because of automation. [Ref. 21] [Ref. 37) [Ref. 41]
(31 Structure 11ithin the Firm. Literature regarding the structure of the
firm is also in agreement. Firms must be responsive to changes in technology regarding
the structure they adopt if they wish to be successful. It is likely that organizations will
downsize and decentralize in the future to keep the competitive advantage over their
competitors and that the days of the big bureaucracy are numbered. [Ref. 34: pp. 29-41.]
[Ref. 34: pp. 67-79.] [Ref. 35] [Ref. 8: pp. 59-71.] [Ref. 41] One particular view predicts
an increased use of contractors to complete specific types of work. People will organize
themselves into small specialized work groups and contract themselves out to larger
firms. [Ref. 41] In addition, individuals may take advantage of the autonomy that




The debate regarding technological change and work centers on the required
skill levels and the organization of work. The debate on skill-levels has two directions.
Technology will enhance skill-levels or it will degrade skill-levels. In reality, it is not
technology that degrades skill-levels but the actions of management. [Ref. 19] [Ref. 18]
[Ref. 21] [Ref. 41] [Ref. 10] In a number of cases cited where technology had been in-
troduced, resulting in the degradation of worker skill levels, a consequence not consid-
ered by management has been unhappy, disgruntled, or in the worst case, displaced
workers. These effects are counterproductive and detract from the optimum use for
personnel. To forecast these side effects and thus enable a counter effort to deal with
them, workers should be involved with the planning stage when the introduction of a
new technology is being considered. Training programs should be put in place to retrain
workers who are displaced by the new technology and attrition is the better policy than
retrenchment if positions need to be trimmed as a result of the new technology.
New technologies are creating more complex systems in the workplace.
[Ref. 10: pp. 153-171.] This, ii, turn, is placing new demands on supervisors and main-
tenance staff. Supervisors are required to do more problem-solving and to have inter-
personal skills. The supervisor's responsibility is shifting from man-management toward
total-system management, since he needs to keep the system functioning. This places
extra emphasis on the maintenance staff beca,,se, if the system is down, productivity
falls. The types of maintenance specialist that are in demand are electronic specialists
and computer specialists.
Another consequence of technological change is that, as the complexity of
manufacturing systems increases, the quality of the maintenance, operations and man-
agement staff must increase to maintain satisfactory operating levels. [Ref. 10: pp.
173-195] Also, future manufacturing systems will need to be designed with people in
mind to ensure they are safe, easy to operate and maintain, and thus operate at satis-
factory levels. [Ref. 19] [Ref. 10: pp. 173-195] [Ref. 181
c. Summary
The occupational structure of the workforce is changing. The number of
jobs that require higher levels of education (college) are increasing and the number of
jobs that require lower levels of education (below high school graduate) are decreasing.
There is a shift in occupations from the blue-collar to the white-collar industries. The
increased demand for the more highly educated employee combined with the possible
decline in demand for the middle manager has implications for the debate on the
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polarization of the workforce. The argument that technological change will create
large-scale unemployment is not supported.
The structure of the firm will change as new process and product technolo-
gies become available. Firms will tend to continue the trend to downsize and decen-
tralize. Some firms may increase the use of contractors.
Workers skills are in the hands of management. Management can imple-
ment new technologies that can both enhance and degrade a worker's skills. Studies and
theories have shown that if a worker's job is degraded then productivity may decline due
to poor morale. Productivity is enhanced if the worker is made part of the decision to
introduce new technologies.
Maintenance skills are attaining more importance as systems become more
dependant on maintenance personnel to keep systems working for satisfactory perform-
ancc. Better problem-solving skills are also emphasised for the employees working with
newer advanced systems.
3. Military
This section of the synthesis of the literature as it relates to the military is di-
vided into three parts; Policy, Future Battlefield, and Other. Policy discusses the De-
partment of Defense (DOD) policies towards technology. Future Battlefield deals with
the characteristics of the future battlefield. Other factors discuss the problems for DOD
as they relate to the maintenance of equipment and medical technology.
a. Policy
DOD is committed to the policy of using technology to maintain an ad-
vantage over the numerically superior Soviets. [Ref. 47] [Ref. 50] [Ref. 621 DOD believes
the implications of such a policy will be fewer personnel of a higher quality with more
skills. The pace of change of military technologies is increasing. [Ref. 47] This is prob-
ably the result of the increased budgets for military R&D of the 1980's. The size of the
DOD R&D budgets are of concern to some quarters in the U.S. Some see the policy
of pushing the technological advantage as counterproductive for the U.S. economy.
Such a policy may be taking valuable resources away from civilian projects and causing
hardship for some firms and individuals. [Ref. 701
b. Future Battlefield
The future battlefield is likely to have the following characteristics: in-
creased lethality; highly electronic; an abundance of real-time information; and highly
mobile. The role that the soldier will play is disputed.
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In the main, the military opinion is that the soldier will be the key to the
future battlefield. [Ref. 501 [Ref. 55] [Ref. 511 [Ref. 52] [Ref. 54] This future soldier will
need to have initiative, be better educated and better trained to operate the more so-
phisticated equipment that will be at his disposal in the uncertain and extremely dan-
gerous environment that will exist. Biotechnology may be able to be used to enhance
soldier's skills and thus increase survivability and the chance for mission success. [Ref.
54]
Contrary to the opinion that the soldier will play a central role in the future
battlefield another view holds that the future battlefield will be too dangerous for hu-
mans. Therefore it will be dominated by robots and computer operated surveillance and
target acquisition systems. [Ref. 63] [Ref 64] The time frame that has been bracketed
for this scenario is 2005 to 2010.
c. Other
It has been noted that there has been a shift in emphasis from operators to
maintainers within the military ranks. Human performance has been related to the
overall combat or support system performance. [Ref. 57: pp. 122-135] If human per-
formance is not up to standard then the total syem performance is degraded and thus
capability is degraded on the battlefield. This view emphasizes the need for high quality
personnel. Another factor that supports the need for high quality and well trained per-
sonnel is the increased complexity of current equipment. In particular, well trained and
quality maintenance personnel ensure systems are operational. lowever, if availability
of manpower is a problem in the future, it may be an option to design and build less
complex systems to compensate for lower quality personnel. [Ref. 58]
The main points highlighted regarding medicine is that the trend toward
more highly trained medical personnel is required within the military and that standards
of care in a future war may be different from the past. Lessons from recent Israeli ex-
perience show that casualties can be evacuated out of the war zone without the need for
surgery in the war zone.
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MILITARY
Implications for the military can be viewed from a number of perspectives. Firstly,
from the outside. Technological change will affect society in many areas and this will
in turn affect the military which is a part of the society and is dependant on the society
for continued funding and as a source of manpower, equipment, and knowledge. Sec-
ondly, the military can be affected from within. The policies the military adopts and the
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goals it sets for itself determine the many items of equipment and manpower that it
needs to operate effectively. These implications are discussed in two broad sections:
Civilian Initiated Impacts, and Military Initiated Impacts.
1. Civilian Initiated Impacts
a. General
The military cannot be shielded from the pace of technological change in
the total society. All members of the military are part of society and as such are mem-
bers of the various components--social classes, sex, race, etc.--that make up that society.
If the rate of technological change is accelerating and if various parts of the society
change at different rates then the military can expect conflict from within its own ranks.
Sociological theory indicates that change is slower in more rigid structures. It can
therefore be expected that the military will be behind the main portion of society in the
future, regarding new social adaptions to technological change. This in turn, will call
attention to the military as being behind the times and may be a negative factor when
considering the military's image in the rest of community.
The military is one of the biggest investors in future technology in the U.S.
and must pay more attention to the overall consequences for society of the technology
they are developing. In a period when the world population is becoming increasingly
aware of what is going on around them, more pressure will be placed on the law-makers
to control what is being developed and how it is used by the military. The military can
expect more and more pressure from the U.S. population in general and from other
countries that the U.S., in earlier years, was able to keep under their control.
Studies can be initiated to determine where technological change is likely to
take society. This is beginning to happen with more and more organizations scanning
their horizons for new opportunities and governments realizing that the world is chang-
ing through the globalization of economies and that they need to be informed if their
country is going to benefit from the future. However, these new studies must be broad
to ensure that all possible effects are considered (i.e., both positive and negative) and are
not ignored for the sake of short-term profit or ego.
Future forecasts will need to be more realistic. The population is becoming
more informed of the future and will be less likely to be overwhelmed by overly opti-
mistic predictions. Forecasters need to place things in perspective and consider whether
society will want to change for the sake of it. The problem of overly optimistic forecasts
for the military is that with its continuing policy of technological superiority there will
be a tendency to chase ideas. The mind set of the U.S. military that technology must be
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exploited to ensure superiority over an enemy, initiated by the Cold War with the
Soviets, will cost a tremendous amount of U.S. taxpayers' money for possibly no gain.
This attitude has attracted many critics, of whom Tirman [Ref. 701 is just
one. The concern is with Defense Industry, who are trying to attract lucrative DOD
contracts, may start to play the game and come up with wild and wonderful ideas which
are picked up by the military with large expenditures of DOD dollars. In the mean time,
and this is Tirman's concern, the civilian market has been deprived of money and per-
sonnel to devote to civilian R&D.
The use of technology to improve both process and product is being pur-
sued by more businesses. Larger R&D investments within civilian markets are becoming
widespread as the market opens up to the global economy. This in turn will attract large
salaries for research scientists to work on civilian projects. This trend will begin to
compete more with DOD who, most likely, will be unable to match the higher civilian
wages. This competition will be economy wide as private funds will be directed into the
universities and the private research organizations which may possibly squeeze DOD out
as the main customer for R&D in the U.S.
This trend will force DOD to become more realistic as to the technologies
that are really important to them and it may force them to adopt more civilian developed
products and processes that can be directly adapted to military applications.
The dominance of information in the fut.re will produce an individual who
is better informed and more aware of the problems facing society. This individual will
be more likely to question things because of this broader perspective on life. This indi-
vidual will question decisions that are made by government and may belong to one or
several social movements. This individual may enlist in the military and bring with him
these attitudes. If current training policies and military practices continue this individual
will find it hard to fit into such an environment. If in the future this individual is the rule
and not the exception then the military may have to change its practices radically.
b. Work
The changes outlined for the occupational structure in the economy will
have significant effects for the military. The shift from blue-collar to white-collar work
will produce a population with new skills. The increase in demand for jobs with higher
levels of education and the drop in demand for lower educated employees will place more
pressure on the population to stay at school and the government to help those who
cannot afford to stay at school. Educational curricula will change to meet the new re-
quirements. A problem with such a shift in the occupational structure is there will be
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those who are unable to change to meet the new needs. These people will be the
underprivileged with the majority as minorities. In addition, the majority of the labor
force growth will be composed of minorities. This creates the potential for a mismatch
of skills. The under skilled minority worker will be looking for a job and the employer
will be looking for high-skilled workers. This situation has the potential to create a
polarized workforce with the lower class being made up of minorities.
While this scenario is unfolding, the military will be under the same pressure
as the civilian economy to recruit higher-skilled personnel. This situation will force the
military into a conflict of interests. In the U.S. the military is supposed to be represen-
tative of the population, i.e., racial groups within the military are meant to represent, in
equal proportions, the population of the U.S. Therefore, if the majority of minorities
are lower skilled and their population is also the fastest growing in the U.S., one policy
says "recruit more minorities" and the other conflicting policy states "recruit more high-
skilled recruits" (who are mostly white).
This leaves a choice for the military. They can forget the policy of equal
proportionment of races but this is unlikely in a country that prides itself on equal op-
portunity. The only other policy alternative is to provide more initial training for the
low skilled recruit. This policy will cause new screening procedures to be implemented
to locate the low-skilled recruit who will succeed and not drop out.
Another point regarding attracting the higher-skilled recruit is there will be
more competition from the civilian economy for the same individual. The military may
not be able to compete with the wages that this individual may be able to attract in the
civilian sector.
The possible movement of middle-class Americans out of the urban areas
and into the non-urban areas will have some effect on the military. These families pro-
vide a large proportion of the military's manpower. Urban areas in the U.S. that were
once targeted for recruiting will no longer have the resource base they once had. New
studies will be needed to identify the best recruiting areas.
Women are also one of the fastest growing areas of the labor force where
technological change is depleting clerical jobs that were a traditional area for employ-
ment for women. This will give an incentive to women to find new areas of employment
and the military will come under increased pressure to employ more women. This pres-
sure combined with the additional pressures of lesser availability of high-skilled recruits
and the relative decline of the 16 to 19 year-olds, may force the military to reconsider its
policy toward women in the military.
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c. Other
The rapid advances in medicine will probably bring about an increase in the
life-span and a rise in the general level of health of the population. This may provide
an opportunity for the future manpower resources. Some U.S. based jobs may be filled
by older workers and the mandatory retirement age may be increased in response to
these trends. Older recruits may be considered in the future if the availability of younger
recruits is dwindling.
A point regarding civilian influences in the future is the fact that, as a result
of technological change, the population will have, overall, a higher standard of living.
It is conceivable people will be able to travel more freely and comfortably in the future.
Higher skilled individuals will also enjoy higher wage opportunities. This environment
may produce a population that is not attracted to the perceived rigorous life of the mil-
itarv.
2. Nilitary Initiated Impacts
a. MIanpower
(1) Quality and Skill Level. The future manpower requirements will be
dictated by the operating environment that the military believe to be relevant and the
requirements of the combat and support systems that will be operated in that environ-
ment. The U.S. Army's concept for ARMY 21 provides such guidance. The environ-
ment that future ccnflicts will generate and in which the military will operate will be
lethal, mobile, work intensive for the people involved, and very stressful. The individual
characteristics specified as necessary for operation and survival in this environment, and
as outlined by the ARMY 21 concept, indicate a requirement for high quality recruits.
In addition, the leadership requirements for the future battlefield emphasise initiative,
broad education and a balanced personality. These characteristics also point to a high
quality recruit.
These individual characteristics for the future are based on an analysis
of the traits necessary to operate and survive in the battlefield environment and not
necessarily those needed to operate the combat and support systems. Though many
combat and support systems will be complex in their design and construction, the oper-
ation of the systems will not necessarily be difficult. In fact, technology may make the
operation of some systems easier.
Other authors (both civilian and military) have suggested because
combat and support systems have become more complex, the role of maintenance per-
sonnel has been elevated and become critical to the success of the military mission. In
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addition, there has been a shift in manning levels that reflects higher proportions of
support personnel and fewer operations personnel. These points also suggest there is an
increasing emphasis on maintenance rather than on the operation of the equipment.
It can be concluded that the emphasis in the future will be in main-
taining a high quality force. High quality personnel will be needed to operate and fight
in the battlefield environment because of the unique conditions in which these personnel
will operate. Finally, high-skilled personnel will be required to maintain the complex
combat and support systems used within the military.
(2) Other Issues. The effects of high quality and skilled manpower re-
quirements will result in longer training pipelines, especially if lower quality recruits are
being brought up to a basic level before entering the main training pipeline. Complex
combat and support systems will require more training time to cover the issues involved.
A possible alternative for the high-skilled manpower needed for
maintenance positions is the use of contractors to maintain systems. This alternative will
need to be weighed against the effects on availability of the systems being maintained,
the effects for operational deployment of the systems, and the costs involved.
Another possible scenario for the future is an entirely automated
battlefield which would evolve in response to the highly dangerous nature of future
conflicts for human combatants. This concept represents a radical change in direction
for the art of war and its discussion was most noticeable by its absence when the future
was outlined by military authors. This future scenario may be longer in coming than
some forecasters perceive it to be (2005-2010) because of resistance to the idea from
traditional military thinkers in DOD. Applying the optimistic forecast lessons [Ref. 16]
and such a scenario may be more 50 or more years away.
The use of biotechnology to enhance soldier skills is an interesting
concept. The moral questions associated with such a policy will be debated for many
years however the military applications for this technology are many. 12 However the
money and time spent in development for this could be used for more humanitarian
purposes and thus the debate will rage.
12 For instance, the use of biotechnology to produce vaccines for chemical and biological
agents will provide signifcant advantages for the side with such a capability. This capability will
allow safe operation in an environment that is deadly to the enemy.
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b. Structure
Different structures for the U.S. Army will need to be considered. The ex-
tensive amount of information that will be available on the battlefield in the future will
need to travel from the top to the very lowest levels quickly to take advantage of tactical
situations. The current hierarchies within the military will not be able to disseminate
information quickly enough. Levels of bureaucracies will need to be reduced and a
flatter structure adopted in order for the information and decisions to be passed within
the chain.
The higher quality forces will need more autonomy in their operations if
they are to complete their missions as communications are likely to be restricted on the
battlefield. Field commanders will need the autonomy to change a plan if the tactical
situation varies as they may not be able to obtain timely authority for such a change.
Fear of the consequences of such an action may stifle any initiative commanders may
wish to exercise if autonomy is not promoted.
One consequence of flatter structures will be slower promotion for the ma-
jority within the military. If the best quality personnel are going to be maintained then
some fast tracking policies will need to be implemented. The use of civilians may be
considered for less critical areas to allow for a leaner military structure and thus faster
promotion rates to help attract quality personnel.
c. A ledical
The future poses several problems for both the structure and function of the
Militan.y Health Services System (MIISS). The primary problem in the future is a fun-
damental change in the nature of the military threat. Current doctrine for military
medicine is based on the threat of a land-based war, similar to the experiences of World
War II and the Korean War. The future may see conflicts of a different nature. The
second problem will result from the changing nature of medicine; improvements in
medical technology and the evolving necessity for skilled health-care providers in the
civilian work place will affect the numbers and types of military medical personnel that
will be essential by the year 2025. The final problem will result from increasingly con-
strained military budgets on one hand and a greater demand for health care on the other.
Any future structure for the MHSS will need to incorporate solutions for all three
problems.
(1) Injuries. The first point that can be made regarding the future is the
types of injuries that will be encountered. The major weapon systems (e.g., missiles,
artillery, aircraft, etc.) will be over-the-horizon or remote-controlled platforms. They
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will have both increased range, accuracy, and destructive potential. The effects of such
weapons on casualties will see more fatalities and fewer treatable irtruries. These
treatable injuries will be classed as trauma cases.
Other weapons that will continue to be employed on the battlefield
include: automatic rifles, chemical weapons, high-explosive projectiles, and blast weap-
ons (e.g., land mines, grenades). The injuries associated with these weapons will also
be classed as a trauma injuries.
(2) Effects In the War Zone. Over-the-horizon weapons virtually elim-
inate the concept of a secure communication zone.13 [Ref. 50] The enemy can lower
troop morale by eliminating a large support facility such as the 500- to 1000-bed mobile
hospitals if they were established in the communication zone. Secondly, the 1000-bed
hospital ships are basically defenseless and the large red cross painted on their sides
won't be observed when the missile is released from 200 miles away; the ship will look
like an aircraft carrier or a tanker to the operator of the weapon system. If the large
medical facilities in the operational area are destroyed, the replacement of hundreds of
skilled medical personnel will require time and the commander of the operational plan
may have difficulty in finding an alternative source of medical support in the short term.
Unfortunatelv, the expected duration of the engagements is expected to be at most 180
days, which is insufficient time to train new medical personnel.
(3) Training. The biggest impact of technology on military medicine
will be its effect on the supply and cost of trained personnel. Because of the large in-
vestment in human capital required for future physicians, it is conceivable that medical
services in the war zone will be prepackaged and administered by enlisted personnel. The
past has provided guidance that medical standards of care will preclude most surgery in
the operational area, except for the immediate repair of arterial trauma. Casualties will
be stabilized and evacuated to a secure area, out of the combat zone, for surgery. This
secure area could be either in an allied country or in continental U.S. (CONUS). If
facilities in CONUS are used then the optioa of using civilian hospitals should not be
discounted. If civilian hospitals in CONUS are to be used for the treatment for combat
casualties, then these hospitals and their staffs will need to train for the procedures,
likely workloads, and likely case mixes.
13 The communication zone is an area designated under the operational plan. Traditionally
it has always been the secure area (i.e., free from major enemy ground forces and out of range of
enemy direct-fire weapons) where the necessary support and logistics units have operated to support
the operational units in the war zone.
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The rotation policy for trained enlisted personnel will need to be re-
viewed. An offset for the long training times needed to train enlisted personnel to op-
erate specialized equipment and procedures within one command is needed to ensure
enlisted personnel will remain in one command for longer periods of time. Such a policy
will allow for the more efficient use of these trained personnel.
For entry-level personnel, new technology will yield medical instru-
ments that are easier to operate but these delicately-calibrated instruments will require
factory-trained maintenance engineers and a controlled environment for their operation.
Personnel with little academic preparation may be trained for several months to push
buttons and to trouble shoot instruments, but the interpretation of the validity or the
significance of the results require the skills of either a skilled technician or physician. In
another 30 years the training and synergy required for the skilled technician or physician
will not be available at military treatment facilities (MTFs), unless substantial organ-
izational and structural changes are made in the way that the DOD delivers health care.
The training of physicians will continue to be expensive and the de-
mand for more spccialized doctors will increase. Retention will decrease as demand for
specialized physicians in the civilian market increases. One possible solution to this
problem would be to train physicians in a new specialty called military medicine.14 This
spccialty may make the physician less marketable to the civilian hospitals. Another al-
ternative, if training of physicians becomes too expensive, is to establish contracts for
civilian specialists.
(4; Civilians as an Alternative. Active-duty personnel will continue to
be more costly than reserve or civilian providers. In terms of 1987 dollars and manpower
requirements, the U.S. Nav would save S15 million if t replaced hospital corpsmen with
civilian attendants and S12 million if it substituted civilian for military nurses. Estimates
of the staffing costs of the in-house military option--private sector contracting or civil
service--range between S332 million to S372 million. [Ref. 71] This military,'civilian cost
differential will continue to increase as training costs and the costs of health care in
general continue to rise.
14 Military medicine would concentrate on medical care necessary to treat the casualties of
war. It is envisaged that the specialty would focus on the management of trauma, including the
necessary surgical techniques. The types of trauma faced would include gunshot wounds, frag-
mentation wounds, blast injuries, bums, chemical weapon wounds, radiation damage, and energy
weapon wounds.
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If the numbers of civilians in the direct-care syszem, increases, mili-
tary physicians can focus on military medicine. [Ref. 72] With more civilian physician
specialists in the direct-care system, Graduate Medical Education (GME)I5 can be di-
rected toward a military sub-specialty. [Ref 73] The physicians trained under the system
would have an incentive to remain with the military because of fewer opportunities and
a smaller pay differential in comparison to the civiliar. mp,, -ment market. IRef. 74]
15 GME is the term ised to describe the training program for military intern physicians
training to obtain their Board certified specialiy.
86
IV. LIKELY SCENARIO AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The previous chapters bave outlined the literature and the implications of techno-
logical change. To conclude this study a scenario is presented that will, based on the
literature on technological change, provide an outline of what the future may look like
in 2025. The policy implications of the scenario are then discussed and highlight possible
policy initiatives for the 1990's. The scenario will be limited to the areas covered in the
literature and does not attempt to extrapolate to unrelated areas. The scenario is pre-
sented to stimulate discussion and provide one person's opinion of what the future may
be. The scenario is presented in three parts: Environment, Civilian, and Military. The
policy implications for the 1990's of the scenario are then discussed.
A. SCENARIO
1. Environment
There will be no major war on the horizon between the main power centers of
the world economy. These world powers are not necessarily only the U.S. and the Sovict
Union. The world is continuing to operate peacefully within the framework of a world
economy. Many countries have formed economic alliances to compete with the U.S., the
common market countries, and Japan.
The environmental problems of the world continue, however countries are more
aware than they were 35 years prior and at last are directing the proper resources to
combat these problems. A cure for AIDS has been found, but an old adversary is
threatening the world populations--malaria.
Energy supplies are now in abundance as new technologies have been developed
to create more efficient sources of energy. The significance of the Middle East and
Africa as sources of the U.S. oil supply has diminished.
There are still many hot spots in the world that provide an unsettling con-
sciousness for the rest of the world.
2. Civilian
The U.S. economy is struggling to compete within the framework of the world
economy. GNP still continues to grow, however its rate of growth has receded to aver-
age less than two percent per year.
The occupational structure has continued to shift to more white-collar occupa-
tions. The majority of manufacturing sector employment is now white-collar. Manu-
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facturing has been forced to automate the entire production line and now only specialists
and system managers remain. The service-producing sector provides the vast majority
of employment--88 percent. The occupational structure is still demanding higher and
higher proportions of college educated personnel and fewer lower educated personnel.
The agricultural sector has bottomed out providing about 2 percent of employment.
A number of occupations that were dominant in the 1980's and 1990's have
disappeared, being replaced by automation, or new smart computer systems. Some ex-
amples include most clerical positions, draftpersons, and bank tellers.
Typical firm structures are flatter than they were 35 years before. The occupa-
tional structure within these organizations is characterized by the coke bottle shape with
the number of middle-managers significantly diminished from their record numbers in
the 1980's due to the increased use of smart management information systems.
The U.S. is in the middle of a social crises because of the occupational distrib-
ution. The minority workers in the population are finding it harder and harder to gain
an economic foothold as the number of jobs that suit lower skilled workers is decreasing
to record lows.
The participation rate of women in the work force has steadied at about 70
percent. Women have been fully integrated into the occupational structure of the work
force and have attained many positions of power within corporations and government,
including the presidency of the U.S.
Computer and fibre optic communications have paved the way for a small pro-
portion of home contracting businesses that have been set up all over the U.S. in non-
urban areas. These people have chosen to contract their talents to businesses from the
home.
Civilian medicine has become increasingly more expensive and unaffordable for
large parts of the population. The national debate concerning the equity of the distrib-
ution of health care has lead to Congressional initiatives for limited socialized medicine.
Communications and computer technology will disseminate advances in medical
knowledge to a world community. Change will continue to accelerate and the special-
ization of manpower will be proportional to the expanding base of knowledge, which
will become massive even with expert systems and artificial intelligence. Because of the
continuing pace of knowledge within medicine the average life span of an adult white
male in the U.S. has increased to 83 years.
3. Military
a. General
The U.S. military continues to pursue the policy of maintaining a techno-
logical edge with its combat and support systems. DOD budgets have been significantly
cut in real terms since the record years of the 1980's. The total size of the military has
decreased in number to just over 1 million personnel. The U.S. military forces no longer
have significant numbers of troops stationed in foreign countries, excepting Central
America where the U.S. Army has a significant presence.
b. Structure
The U.S. Army combat doctrine has been dominated by the ARMY 21
concept of the 1990's. The Army's forces have been organized into smaller autonomous
units that may be massed under one command as required.
The structure of the fighting Army nas had several levels of the hierarchy
removed to ensure tim~ly passage of real-time information from the top to the bottom.
However, the large bur-aucratic organization at the Pentagon still remains.
The number of combat units has diminished in proportion to the support
units. This is due to the complexity of the combat and support sstems used by the
operational units. The components of most of the combat and support systems must be
repaired within the military system as time precludes their being returned to the con-
tractor for repair and cos, precludes them from being discarded and replaced.
Military combat and support systems continue to be very complex in na-
ture, however operation of the equipment in the main is easier than for earlier models.
Most systems have been componentized and thus provide a good level of availability.
The critical component of the system is the support functions of the organization.
c. Ailitary M1edicine
In the future fewer large Military Treatment Facilities (MTF) will be re-
quired in the war or communication zone. A hospital company of 50 beds will be the
largest facility in the operational area. Its major function will be the stabilization of
trauma, as well as the triage and evacuation site for patients. In its daily operation it
will be a short-term holding area for superficial injury and sick-call. If air superiority
can be maintained in the future, wounded soleiers, in a life-support cocoon, will be
shipped to a fixed MTF located in either (CONUS) or an allied country.
Training for enlisted personnel will be based on the readiness objective with
some enlisted medical personnel trained as emergency medical technicians; advanced
training will prepare the individual to be an independent-duty substitute for a physician.
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Front-line personnel will perform the duties of the platoon corpsman or medic and will
still treat wounds similar to those from previous conflicts. The incremental investment
in readiness will be for training in basic emergency medicine for all operational military
personnel, including medics. Enlisted personnel with advanced tra.Liing will provide the
services of a physician's assistant and will be interfaced electronically with an expert
system. Enlisted training for other medical services, such as Dental, Laboratory, Phar-
macy, and X-ray, will be based only on the Hospital Company and the structural re-
quirements of the direct-care system, 16 rather than peak wartime requirements.
The substitution of civilians for military personnel will occur through the
Civil Service system or through contract agencies. The cost of these additional civilians
at MTF within the current framework is a loss of readiness that will occur because ci-
vilians are not usually required to participate in readiness exercises. [Ref. 75] Civilians
will not be assigned to the war zone, but can replace military personnel in jobs that have
a civilian counterpart, since civilian manpower is less expensive and requires fewer
training and rotation resources. Also, civilians will be able to provide the continuity of
care demanded by a quality force and their families. In a larger context, the use of ci-
vilians will increase readiness as military personnel will specialize in military medicine.
The active-duty medical force will practice readiness exercises with the medical personnel
in the non-active Reserve, which is not currently a policy. Total system costs should
decrease if less training is required to compensate for the attrition of military personnel.
Finally, the military will be unable to train to the level of expertise required by civilian
standards of care by 2025.
d. Mlanpower
Well trained and highly specialized support personnel are needed to func-
tion within the support organizations. Their jobs are made easier by expert systems and
automated test equipment. However their specialized knowledge is critical to the sup-
port function.
The use of robots is increasing but the fully autonomous robot is still not
operational within the military. Robots are performing some maintenance functions and
are used extensively within !ogistic units in CONUS. Operational robots are used for
surveillance, explosive ordinance and mine clearing tasks. Man is still the central figure
in the military.
16 The direct-care system is responsibie for the day-to-day requirements of the beneficiary
population (i.e., the routine non-operational requirements).
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Manpower requirements for the military continue to be for higher quality
recruits. Problems that exist in attracting such recruits include: the increased competi-
tion from the civilian sector; the inability of the military to compete with civilian wage
levels; and the increasing number of minorities as a proportion of the population is de-
creasing the available pool of qualified available. These problems are forcing the military
to rethink many personnel policies. Pilot programs that have been initiated include:
funding high school education for minorities; recruiting more personnel in the age
bracket 22 to 29 years-old; and individual benefit packages for skilled personnel in crit-
ical military occupations.
Entry requirements have changed since the 1990's. Because of the advances
in equipment design and the shift in occupational structure from an operations to a more
support oriented structure, Congress has finally passed a bill opening up all occupations
to women and lifting any ceilings for total numbers of women in any occupation.
The type of recruit that the military is tmrgeting has also changed. The
physical standards for the military have fallen as the shift to more high technology
equipment increases requirements for mentally rather than physically capable operators.
Some military occupations with stringent physical requirements persist, however.
Training has taken on a new importance within the military. Longer train-
ing pipelines are the norm in 2025. All recruits receive more general training to expand
their problem- .olving skills and provide them with more self confidence, which is being
fostered because of the more autonomous role of the basic units within the military. In
addition, the extra training provided for minority recruits adds to the load. More training
is required for support personnel reflecting their critical role in operations.
B. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The scenario has highlighted several policy issues that will be critical to the military
in the next 35 years. The issues from the scenario that are considered the most critical
to the U.S. military are; the significant reduction in forces, the continuing demand for
high quality personnel, several personnel issues, and the increasingly important role of
training.
(I) Force Reductions. The large reduction in the size of the U.S. mili.
tary will create significant problems for DOD. Reductions will have varying impacts for
the local community who depend on local military units for employment, business, etc.
In addition force reductions, in conjunction with a decline in growth in GNP, will result
in significantly reduced DOD budgets. As DOD continues with its high technology
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policy, the mix of personnel and high technology equipment will become critical to en-
sure DOD continues to meet its mission requirements under a tighter budget.
(2) Higher Quality Personnel. The occupational shift in the civilian sec-
tor and the personnel requirements of the military will continue to be in conflict as both
seek the high quality recruit. A possible savior for the military will be its significant re-
duction in size that may offset any increased competition frorn the civilian sector. This
wili need to be weighed against the shift within the military's requirements for more
technical specialties who may also be in demand in the civilian sector. Other implications
of higher quality personnel will be their higher cost in terms of wages and training. In
addition, if there is competition for the same type of specialist in the civilian sector then
the military can expect higher rates of attrition.
(3) Personnel Issues. Several personnel issues have been raised by the
scenario presented in this chapter. First, the acceptance of women into the military.
This change in policy may provide possible relief to a probable tight labor market. The
increasing number of miuorities will be a problem in that the military may wish to
maintain a racial distribution similar to that for thc population as a whole and at the
same time only take the highest quality recruits. This may not always be possible and,
as the scenario suggests, the military will have to employ alterantives to meet both policy
requirements. The recruitment of older age individuals is one option. Recruiting from
this market may provide some savings in training if skilled individuals can be recruited.
Finally, the rising costs of health care within the military may force the military to use
alternate health-care systems that cmploy more civilians.
(4) Training. The consequences of longer training pipelines will be; less
available time on the job for the inuividuals receiving the training, a requirement for
more training personnel, and higher costs. Some implications may be a longer period
of initial engagements for trainees and better screening techniques to ensure high rates
of retention during training.
Other issues raised in the scenario that relate to training include the
increased specialization of medicine and general training for minorities. If the level of
specialization continues within medicine, the military may not be able to keep up the
quality level of medical service. Finally, if minorities are to receive some general training
then new screening procedures for the military recruits will be needed to ensure the
maximun number admitted to such programs completes the period of training.
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APPENDIX OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICATIONS
The following occupational classifications and their descriptions were used by








" Computer Systems Analysts.
" Personnei and Labor Relations Workers.
" Physicians and Surgeons.
" Registered Nurses.
" Other Medical Professionals
" Health Technoiogists, Technicians.
" Teachers.
* Drafters.







0 Stenographers, Typists, Secretaries.









* Plumbers and Pipefitters.
* Other Construction Craft Workers.
* Foreman.
* Machinists.
* Tool and Die Makers.
* Other Metal Working Crafts.
* Mechanics, Repairers.
* Printing Trade Crafts Workers.
* Transportation, Public Utilities Crafts.
* Bakers.
• Crane, Derrick, and Hloist Operators.
* Other Craft Workers.
6. Operatives.
* Assemblers.
• Checkers, Examiners, Inspectors.
* Packers and Wrappers.
• Painters.
* Welders and Flame Cutters.





* Janitors and Sextons.
* Protective Service Workers.
* Food Service Workers.
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